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A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in
Toxics Regulation
David E. Adelman*
INTRODUCTION
Many of the most dramatic and politically salient environmental
disasters have involved toxic substances of one form or another. One
need only think of Love Canal in New York, the Exxon Valdez in
Alaska, Bhopal in India, Chernobyl in Ukraine, or the burning
Cuyahoga River in Ohio.' Yet despite the iconic status of these
events, regulation of toxic substances in the United States (and
elsewhere) is criticized by a broad cross-section of stakeholders and
experts. Among those on the left, the primary statute, the Toxic
Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), is considered moribund and
structurally unsound because of the high barriers it creates to
regulatory action.2 Critics on the right challenge the scientific bases
for regulation and question, often on the basis of cost-benefit
analyses, the rationality of the regulations that exist.3 No one is
particularly happy with the status quo.
4
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1. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and
BackAgain, 7 MINN. J. L. SCT & TECH. 59, 66-67 (2005).
2. See John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for
Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 723, 734-36 (2008) [hereinafter
Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REA C].
3. See David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for
Environmental Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 168-69 (2005). See generally RISKS,
COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn
ed., 1996) (citing evidence revealing the lack of success of recent government risk reduction
expenditures); John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against
Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13 (1997) (arguing that more effective, less costly
risk regulation could replace the current fragmentary regulations).
4. See, e.g., Dieter Pesendorfer, EU Environmental Policy under Pressure: Chemicals
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The long winter, according to some commentators, may be
ending.5 Other countries are establishing innovative chemical
regulatory programs, most notably in the European Union ("EU") and
Canada.6 Recent scientific advances promise a new paradigm of
environmental toxicology that will erase the uncertainties, delays, and
high costs that have plagued toxics regulation for decades.7 Efforts to
reform toxics regulation are even beginning to make headway in the
U.S., with promising legislation recently introduced in both the
House and Senate.
The brightest light in the firmament is surely the Registration,
Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals ("REACH") program
recently enacted in the EU.9 REACH, at least on the surface, corrects
Policy Change between Antagonistic Goals?, 15 ENVTL. POL. 95, 111 (2006) ("The chemical
policy reform under way is the result of serious anomalies of the current EU chemicals
regulation concerning both environmental and health but also business and trade issues. These
anomalies created a situation 'in which all major coalitions view a continuation of the current
situation as unacceptable.').
5. Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part I-Toxicogenomics, 33
ENVTL. L. REP. 10071, 10071 (2003); Kenneth Olden et al., A Bold New Direction for
Environmental Health Research, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1964, 1966 (2001) ("The new era of
toxicogenomics, made possible by advances in human genomics, promises to revolutionize the
practice of public health as it relates to environmental health protection."); N. Rothman et al.,
The Use of Common Genetic Polymorphisms to Enhance the Epidemiologic Study of
Environmental Carcinogens, 1471 BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA Cl, C8 (2001)
("Epidemiologic studies that measure susceptibility genes should provide opportunities to
detect ... gene-environment interactions that may give rise to new clinical and public health
strategies aimed at preventing and controlling cancer."); P. Trinia Simmons & Christopher J.
Portier, Toxicogenomics: The New Frontier in Risk Analysis, 23 CARCINOGENESIS 903, 903-05
(2002) (discussing how new technologies, including transgenic animals, molecular
epidemiology, toxicogenomics, alternative models to animals, and mechanism-based
mathematics, are helping develop more scientifically accurate risk assessments); Lewis L.
Smith, Key Challenges for Toxicologists in the 21st Century, 22 TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL
Sci. 281, 282 (2001) ("The development of genomics, proteomics (the measurement of specific
proteins) and metabonomics (the study of metabolite profiles of either intrinsic or xenobiotic
molecules), combined with a greater knowledge of individual genetic polymorphisms, will offer
new paradigms for hazard evaluation and risk assessment.").
6. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO
IMPROVE EPA'S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW
PROGRAM, 29-31, app. I1 at 44-49 (2005) [hereinafter CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM];
Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 741-43.
7. See, e.g., Marchant, supra note 5, at 10071, 10082.
8. See, e.g., Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, S. 3209, 11 1th Cong. 2d Sess. (2010).
9. David A. Wirth, The EU's New Impact on US. Environmental Regulation, 31
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 91, 100 (2007) (describing REACH entering into force on June I,
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many of the perceived defects in TSCA. Most significantly, it shifts
the burden of proof to chemical manufacturers to demonstrate the
safety of their products and requires them to make detailed
information available to the public on the potential hazards of the
chemicals they make and sell.' 0
Recent scientific advances are described in revolutionary terms."
This excitement is being propelled by expanding "knowledge of
genes associated with disease states to the study of toxicology of
chemical and physical agents" referred to collectively as
"toxicogenomics."' 12 Toxicogenomics is touted as providing a new
generation of powerful screening methods for determining whether a
chemical is toxic and whether individuals have been exposed to or
harmed by a toxic substance.' 3 If this promise is realized,
toxicogenomics will transform toxicology from its quasi-scientific
status, subject to large uncertainties and inferential gaps, to a "true"
science based on detailed understanding of chemical toxicity and
precise testing methods.
As the title suggests, this Article adopts a guarded view of recent
regulatory and scientific developments. While the regulatory
advances in the EU will undoubtedly alter the landscape of toxics
regulation in the United States and elsewhere, they incorporate many
compromises that qualify their procedural and regulatory mandates.
Antecedent laws, particularly the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
("FDCA") in the United States, suggest that the effect of procedural
measures, notably burden shifting, can be muted by agency discretion
over implementation of a law. This may be especially true of
REACH, which opens the door to evasion through its tiered chemical
2007, after the final vote of the European Parliament and approval of the EU Environment
Council).
10. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 744-47.
11. See William E. Bishop et al., The Genomic Revolution: What Does It Mean for Risk
Assessment?, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 983, 983 (2001) (predicting that toxicogenomics "will have
profound impacts on the practice of risk assessment"); Olden et al., supra note 5, at 1966
(predicting that genomics methods "will lead to a revolution in our approach to the study of
toxicity").
12. Simmons & Portier, supra note 5, at 903.
13. Kenneth Olden & Janet Guthrie, Genomics: Implications for Toxicology, 473
MUTATIONS RES. 3, 4 (2001) ("The technology and knowledge generated by genomics offer
new and exciting possibilities for improving predictiveness, relevance and precision of
toxicolog[y].").
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classification scheme and the flexibility it affords manufacturers to
use alternative testing methods.
The past thirty years have demonstrated that toxics regulation is
inextricably tied to scientific understanding. Science informs the
architecture of regulatory regimes and supplies the factual grounding
for agency decisions. I will show that the likelihood is low, if not
negligible, that advances in toxicogenomics will significantly
improve toxics regulation over the next decade or so. Even
proponents of toxicogenomics acknowledge that validation and
refinement of its methods could take ten to twenty years. 14 Recent
experience in the pharmaceutical industry suggests that this estimate
may be overly optimistic. Despite aggressive use of genomics
methods, drug development in the U.S. is in crisis-approvals of
novel drugs hit a twenty-four year low in 200715 despite a doubling of
spending on research and development over the last decade.'
6
Moreover, far from simplifying drug development processes,
scientific understanding of human genetics is making them more
complex 17 and seemingly exacerbating the uncertainties that pervade
drug development and toxicity testing. 18
The enthusiastic embrace of toxicogenomics is nevertheless
understandable, as scientific uncertainties are the source of severe
14. Melvin E. Andersen & Daniel Krewksi, Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century: Bringing
the Vision to Life, 107 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 324, 328 (2009); see also NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ToxICITY TESTING IN THE 21st CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY 16 (2007)
("Implementing the [new toxicity testing strategy] will require improvements and focused effort
over a period of decades.").
15. Avery Johnson & Ron Winslow, Drug Makers Say FDA Safety Focus Is Slowing
New-Medicine Pipeline, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2008, at Al (observing that in 2007 "the FDA
approved just 19 new medicines, the fewest in 24 years").
16. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARMA 2020: THE VISION 1 (2007), http://www.
choruspharna.com/pharma202Ofinal.pdf (commenting that "the industry now spends far more
on research and development (R&D) and produces far fewer new molecules than it did 20 years
ago"); David Malakoff, Spiraling Costs Threaten Gridlock, 322 SCIENCE 210, 210 (2008)
(describing how drug testing costs have "skyrocketed to nearly $400 million on average, even
as the number of major new treatments emerging from the pipeline has fallen").
17. See Elizabeth Pennisi, Breakthrough of the Year: Human Genetic Variation, 318
SCIENCE 1842, 1842 (2007) (reporting that Science chose "human genetic variation" as the
scientific breakthrough of the year and that the studies completed during 2007 "drove home
how complex the genome is").
18. GARY P. PISANO, SCIENCE BUSINESS: THE PROMISE, THE REALITY, AND THE FUTURE
OF BIOTECH 64-68 (2006).
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obstacles to effective regulation. The dearth of information and
modest controls over the thousands of industrial chemicals sold in the
United States are a recurring source of tension in the federal
government and an outrage for many stakeholders. Yet, the
information that science can provide is costly, time-consuming to
obtain, and often of modest value given its large uncertainties.' 9
These shortcomings invite industry opposition to regulatory testing
and have had particular salience for the vast majority of chemicals
that are produced in low quantities. The promise of resolving
scientific uncertainties is therefore central to the hope that
toxicogenomics will transform toxicology and the belief that science
warrants large investments of time and resources.
I will argue that policymakers and stakeholders should be leery of
claims, whether regulatory or scientific, that the tensions in toxics
regulation can be resolved. For the foreseeable future, the problems
are too complex and our understanding too modest for difficult
choices to be avoided. This recognition does not imply that toxics
regulation in the United States cannot be improved, such as by
adopting certain elements of REACH, or that investments in
toxicological science are futile. Rather, it suggests that toxics
regulation, particularly in the near-term, must take into account the
prevailing constraints. It should not be premised on transcending
knowledge gaps, but instead on empowering agencies, in conjunction
with stakeholders, to manage effectively the unavoidable
uncertainties.
One straightforward implication of this approach is that toxics
regulation should avoid the deep epistemic gaps to the extent that it
can. New and existing regulatory regimes reflect this
commonsensical approach by adopting proxies for chemical risk
potential, such as the quantity of a chemical sold annually, its
environmental persistence, and its potential to bioaccumulate.2 ° Other
19. See Thomas Hartung, Toxicology for the Twenty-First Century, 460 NATURE 208, 208
(2009) (stating that worldwide about two billion euros are spent annually on toxicological
testing).
20. See infra Part l.A-B. This kind of tiered strategy predates the passage of TSCA; it
informed the basic structure of the legislation. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., COMM. ON
PRINCIPLES OF DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENV'T, DECISION
MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT app. J, at 224-27 (1975).
2010]
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opportunities also exist to mitigate the informational burdens of
toxics regulation, but they are more controversial and entail complex
tradeoffs. For example, some laws permit use of toxicity testing data
for structurally related or analogous compounds to alleviate testing
burdens, but this strategy is often criticized for being scientifically
unsound. 21 Relying more on post-marketing monitoring, as opposed
to pre-manufacturing testing, can also mitigate the costs of regulatory
delays and of testing itself. However, this necessarily trades off the
possibility of preventing harm ex ante for the prospect of an
enhanced likelihood of detecting risks after a chemical is marketed.
This Article will draw on the one-hundred year history of drug
regulation, which represents the most stringent regulatory system for
chemicals of any kind. An examination of this broader experience
exposes several commonalities and tradeoffs inherent in chemical
regulation. It also offers a comparative perspective on the strategies
used in the regulation of chemicals that suggests an upper limit for
the stringency of regulation that is politically and scientifically
viable. Two important insights emerge from this comparative
analysis: (1) the ex ante-ex post dichotomy that is often drawn
between common law and statutory law is overstated-if not simply
false-for chemical regulation, and (2) for most chemicals tiered
"precautionary" systems like those embodied in REACH represent
more of a change in rhetoric than a fundamental shift in substance
over the status quo.
Complementing the comparative historical analysis, this Article
will provide an overview of recent scientific developments and their
implications for toxics regulation. I expect the direct impacts to be
marginal, at least for the foreseeable future. More importantly, given
the limited resources available to toxics programs and the steep
opportunity costs that these financial constraints impose, I will
advocate that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences ("NIEHS")
invest modestly in toxicogenomic research. The emerging complexity
of human genetics suggests that it would be prudent to allow research
21. See infra Part IA-B.
[Vol. 32:377
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to progress in the biomedical sciences before focusing more intensely
on toxicogenomics.
The final part of the Article examines promising opportunities to
improve the regulation of toxic substances, which is the subject of
renewed interest in Congress and rising support from a broad cross-
section of stakeholders.22 It will evaluate three primary policies: the
virtues of tiered regulatory regimes, the potential role of post-
marketing testing, and the value of complementary innovation-
oriented policies to promote development of "green chemistry"
processes and compounds. Each will be discussed with an eye toward
emerging legislative efforts to amend TSCA.
I. ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING TRENDS IN Toxics REGULATION
"The objective [of TSCA] is to keep environmental
thalidomides out of action.,
23
The modem era of high-volume chemical manufacturing is a
relatively recent creation. Chemical production experienced
remarkable growth during the twentieth century-global quantities of
manufactured chemicals increased four-hundred fold between 1930
and 2001, increasing from one million tons to more than 400 million
tons annually.24 In the United States alone, approximately 15.2
trillion pounds of chemicals are either manufactured or imported each
year.25 On average, manufacturers add over seven-hundred new
chemicals each year to the more than eighty thousand that are already
commercialized.2 6 Yet, only 1134 chemicals-less than 1.5 percent of
22. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Chemical Industry Lends Support to Reform, WASH. POST,
Aug. 9, 2009, at E4; Aaron Lovell, Competing Groups Agree on Some TSCA Principles but
Disputes Remain, DEF. ENV'T ALERT (Inside EPA, Arlington, Va.) Aug. 18, 2009; see also
Kid-Safe Chemicals Act of 2008, S. 3040, 110th Cong. (2008); Kid-Safe Chemicals Act of
2008 H.R. 6100, 110th Cong. (2008).
23. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971 and Amendment; Hearing on S.1478
before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 135 (1971)
(statement of William H. Rodgers, Jr., Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington).
24. Commission White Paper on Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, at 4, COM
(2001) 88 final (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Strategy].
25. MICHAEL P. WILSON ET AL., CAL. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., GREEN CHEMISTRY IN
CALIFORNIA: A FRAMEWORK FOR LEADERSHIP IN CHEMICALS POLICY AND INNOVATION 1 n.A
(2006).
26. See CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 1-2.
Journal of Law & Policy
those commercialized-are regulated under five major federal
statutes, including TSCA.27
Progress in the area of toxics regulation, as the preceding numbers
suggest, has been notoriously slow, and the track record for TSCA is
especially troubling.28 Over the course of thirty-three years, the EPA
has issued formal regulations banning or restricting the production or
use of just five chemicals of the approximately 62,000 that were in
commerce at the time of TSCA's passage.29 Similarly, of the more
than 45,000 chemicals that the EPA has reviewed since 1979,30 the
vast majority had little or no health or safety data and only about
3800 chemicals were subject to any kind of regulatory action.31 Of
those actively reviewed, about half (1700) were withdrawn by the
manufacturer, 1300 were subjected to specific workplace controls
pursuant to consent orders under TSCA section 5(e), and 570 were
commercialized on the condition that the manufacturer submit notices
to the EPA of any significant new uses.32
Limited regulatory oversight has allowed production of health and
safety information to stagnate. Several studies have exposed the
dearth of data even for chemicals produced and used in the largest
volumes. A 1997 report issued by Environmental Defense found that
basic toxicology screening studies were available for only twenty-
nine percent of the one hundred high-production volume ("HPV")
chemicals in their sample.33 A subsequent EPA study of 3000 HPV
27. WILSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 13.
28. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: COMPARISON OF
U.S. AND RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES TO PROTECT AGAINST THE
RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS 2 (2007) [hereinafter RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS] ("Of the over
82,000 chemicals currently in the TSCA inventory, about 62,000 were already in commerce
when EPA began reviewing chemicals in 1979.").
29. Id. at 18; see also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION:
OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 10
(2009).
30. RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 8. Approximately 33,000 of the pre-
manufacture notices ("PMNs") were subject to review beyond a determination that the chemical
was exempt (e.g., low-volume chemicals, polymers). See id. at 22 & n.22.
31. Id. at21-22.
32. Id. at 22. Under TSCA section 5(a)(2), EPA has issued significant new use rules for
160 existing chemicals. Id. at 18.
33. John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for
Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1365, 1382 (2008) [hereinafter Applegate, Bridging the
[Vol. 32:377
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chemicals concluded: "[N]o basic toxicity information... is publicly
available for 43% of the high volume chemicals manufactured in the
US and a full set of basic toxicity information is available for only
7% of these chemicals. 34 The findings of these studies were
reinforced by a 1999 EU report, which found that basic toxicology
data were available for only fourteen percent of HPV chemicals in
the EU and no data existed for twenty-one percent of them.35
One must be careful, though, not to over-interpret these numbers.
The volumes of individual chemicals produced are highly skewed-a
small number of chemicals dominate the quantities sold annually.
Just three hundred chemicals account for more than ninety-nine
percent of the tonnage of all chemicals sold annually in the U.S.,36
and fewer than 5500 chemicals are produced in amounts equal to or
greater than 0.000066 percent of the total quantity sold (i.e., above
ten thousand pounds per year).37 Consistent with these numbers, a
2005 study found that 159 to 234 chemicals were detected in the
umbilical cord blood of ten newborns, and a large representative
study of the U.S. population found 116 chemicals in blood and urine
samples. 38 Thus, while the quantities may not appear small in
absolute terms, the great majority of chemicals in U.S. commerce are
produced in minuscule quantities in relative terms.
The aggregate figures also ignore evidence indicating that a small
subset of chemicals is likely to be toxic. Few compounds that have
been tested over the past twenty-five years have tested positive for
toxicity-approximately eighty-seven percent of tested chemicals
were not found to be acutely toxic, ninety-three percent did not cause
Data Gap]. The study defined "HPV" as any chemical produced in volumes exceeding one
million pounds annually. Id.
34. Id.
35. Commission Assessment of Additional Testing Needs under REACH: Effects of
(Q)SARS, Risk Based Testing and Voluntary Industry Initiatives, at 5 (Sept. 2003) (prepared by
Finn Pedersen et al.) [hereinafter Add7 Testing Needs Under REACH].
36. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF., HIGH HOPES, LOW MARKS: A FINAL REPORT
CARD ON THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL CHALLENGE 9 (2007) (describing how
"HPV chemicals comprise the bulk of industrial chemicals in commerce when measured by
tonnage").
37. Id. at 10. Similar production volumes exist in Europe, where about ten thousand
chemicals are sold in quantities that exceed ten metric tons annually and a further twenty
thousand are sold in one to ten metric tons. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 4.
38. WILSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 27, 31.
2010]
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skin irritation, and about ninety-seven percent did not have
discernible reproductive effects.39 Similarly, under the European
REACH program scientists estimate that of the pre-1981 chemicals
produced in quantities equal to or greater than one-hundred metric
tons annually, about 5500 substances, only about 2.5 percent of the
total tested will be reproductive toxins.4 ° In aggregate, regulators
generally believe that no more than twenty percent of the chemicals
tested will display sufficient toxicity to require regulatory action.41
Two important factors could enhance the tractability of regulating
industrial chemicals. The first is the continuity of chemicals listed as
HPVs and production processes generally. Of the many thousands of
chemicals in commerce, just eight percent (248 in total) of the 2943
HPV chemicals in U.S. commerce today were introduced after
1979.42 The second is the heterogeneity of chemical characteristics,
production levels, and uses, which ought to enable use of relatively
straightforward triage methods and tiered regulatory regimes. The
Parts that follow analyze existing chemical regulation in the U.S. and
recent regulatory developments in Europe. Several commonalities
emerge from this comparative analysis that highlight the incremental
nature of advances in toxics regulation.
A. Current TSCA Regime and Pending Legislative Amendments
Among the most striking features of toxics regulation in the U.S.
is the degree to which the basic contours of the debate have remained
the same. The issues that animated debates in 1971 over the
legislation that ultimately became TSCA are essentially identical to
the ones that dominate debate today. While there are new potential
threats, such as endocrine-disrupting chemicals, the central scientific
and legal issues have evolved very little. Concerns about the large
uncertainties in toxicology testing, moral and technical objections
raised against the use of cost-benefit analyses and economic
discounting, and debate over whether manufacturers or the
39. Hartung, supra note 19, at 209.
40. Id. In absolute terms, of course, this small relative number (i.e., about 138
compounds) may still be significant.
41. See infra Part I.A.
42. WILSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 43.
[Vol. 32:377
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government should bear the burden of proof in regulatory decision-
making are as alive today as they were in the 1970s.43
Regulating industrial chemicals has never been easy. It took
Congress almost five years to pass TSCA.44 Driven by widespread
concerns about the risks from exposures to major chemicals such as
mercury, vinyl chloride, and asbestos, the Nixon Administration
elevated toxics regulation to the top of the environmental agenda.45 In
the 1971 annual report of the Council on Environmental Quality, the
Nixon Administration went so far as to conclude that "from 60 to 90
percent of cancer is authoritatively attributed to environmental
causes."46 In its opposition to new regulations, the chemical industry
claimed that the annual costs of regulation could approach two billion
dollars, with testing per chemical running upwards of $100,000 and
taking two to three years.47 The government countered that the costs
would be much lower, as only a small subset of commercial
chemicals-it estimated twenty percent of the one thousand new
chemicals introduced annually-would require testing.48
43. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF SC. supra note 20, at 12-14, 17-22, 39-44, 93-96; Valerie
J. Brown, REACHing for Chemical Safety, 111 ENv'T HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A766, A768
(2003) (arguing that the "combination of the increased financial burden of testing, the
bureaucracy of registration and authorization, and the requirement of applying the
precautionary principle will discourage innovation and could rin many small and medium-
sized enterprises").
44. See Gladwin Hill, Congress Plans New Push to Control Toxic Chemical Products,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1975, at 10; Steven Rattner, A Law on Toxics Seems a Certainty, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1976, at 157.
45. See John W. Finney, Senate Votes Regulation of Hazardous Chemicals, 77-0, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 1972, at 10 ("The legislation, which was sent to the House, is an outgrowth of
concern that developed two years ago over the potential hazards of mercury poisoning from
industrial wastes."); Gladwin Hill, U.S. Agency Urges a Drive to Bar Cancer by Screening
Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1976, at 38.
46. Hill, supra note 45. The CEQ report went on to argue that .'[s]ome observed cancer
undoubtedly arises from natural sources like radiation and asbestos, but much of the remainder
is probably associated with carcinogenic agents produced by man."' Id.
47. Rattner, supra note 44; Harold M. Schmeck Jr., Chemicals Face More Safety Testing,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1977, at 99.
48. See Schmeck, supra note 47; Rattner, supra note 44, at 157 (indicating that the
General Accounting Office estimates the cost for chemical testing would be much lower at just
$100-200 million annually). Initial studies were consistent with the government's estimates,
finding that ten to sixteen percent of the chemicals tested by October of 1977 exhibited
carcinogenic properties in animals. John Vinocur, Major Enforcement Gaps Hobble Law to
Control Toxic Substances, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1977, at 1.
2010]
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The central sticking point in 1971 was whether all chemicals
would be subject to pre-market approval and toxicity testing.4 9 The
Senate, which supported rigorous pre-market testing, and the House,
which did not, split on the issue and did not resolve their differences
until 1976.50 Compromise was propelled by, among other events, the
discovery of polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") in the Hudson
River and in human breast milk.5' Yet the Senate and House
harmonized the competing legislation by opting largely for the
weaker House bill. Environmental groups played an important role in
passage of the law by withdrawing their demand for pre-market
testing of all new chemicals. 52 The political calculus for supporting
an inadequate bill was premised on what proved to be a false belief,
namely, that the 1976 law would be a first step toward more
comprehensive and rigorous regulation.
5 3
The regulatory deficiencies of TSCA that emerged from this
compromise have been recounted many times. I will highlight two
provisions that are relevant to the central thesis of this Article and
that contrast with those found in REACH and the FDCA. Unlike
these other statutes, TSCA does not incorporate a regulatory approval
49. Finney, supra note 45, at 10.
50. Hill, supra note 44, at 10.
51. New Breed of Pollutants: The Dangers They Carty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
7, 1977, at 42, 43-44 [hereinafter New Breed of Pollutants].
The major impetus for passage of the law came from PCB's [sic]....
Traces of [PCBs] are found in nearly all human-tissue samples taken in
industrialized countries. It is in mothers' milk and in the flesh of fish of many fresh-
water lakes and streams. The chemical has shown up in penguin eggs in Antarctica and
in animals captured in Greenland.
Id. at 43; see also Richard D. Lyons, House Votes Ban on Output of PCB 's [sic] within 3 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1976, at 61. Other contributing events included the incident of Kepone
poisoning of workers in July 1975 and the catastrophic explosion involving dioxin in Seveso,
Italy, in July 1976. Peter Gwynne et al., The Chemicals around Us, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1978,
at 25, 28.
52. Rattner, supra note 44, at 157 (describing how the Sierra Club withdrew support for
required pre-market testing of all new chemicals).
53. See id. ("Supporters of stronger legislation believe that the current bill is better than
no bill at all. 'It's a start,' said Janie Kinney, counsel to the Consumer Protection and Finance
Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee: 'In three years, when this comes up for
renewal, there'll be another chance."').
[Vol. 32:377
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regime; instead, it requires chemical manufacturers to submit a "pre-
manufacture notice" ("PMN") prior to the marketing of a new (i.e.,
post-1976) chemical.54
The notice that a PMN provides is nominal, however, because
TSCA does not impose any standards for the quality or type of
information that must be submitted.55 This omission is compounded
by the perfunctory review to which the EPA subjects most PMNs-
relying as it does on largely unvalidated screening models and
conventions.16 Regulatory oversight is cramped further by the ninety-
day limit TSCA places on the EPA review process.57 This narrow
window often is preclusive of regulatory action, which must be based
on a showing of "unreasonable risk,"58 because the burden is on the
EPA to demonstrate that regulation is warranted.59
The procedural barriers under section 6 of TSCA, which apply to
new and grandfathered, pre-1976 chemicals, go beyond assessing the
risk of the chemical in question. In addition to having the burden of
proving that unreasonable risks exist, the EPA must show that the
prohibitions, limitations, or requirements it imposes are "the least
burdensome" available. 60 Furthermore, its decisions are subject to
"searching review" by courts under the substantial evidence
standard.61 As a consequence, the EPA imposed regulations on pre-
1976 chemicals only five times over the past thirty-four years, and it
all but conceded this authority since its attempt to regulate asbestos
was largely struck down by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in 1991.62 TSCA in effect has grandfathered ninety-five percent of
54. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2006); see also Wirth, supra note 9, at 99.
55. Wirth, supra note 9, at 99.
56. CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing EPA's use of simple,
routinized screening models or classification schemes to conduct limited review for all but
twenty percent of the PMNs that it receives); see also RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note
28, at 13 ("In June 2005, we recommended that EPA develop a strategy for improving and
validating the models that EPA uses to assess and predict the hazards of chemicals.").
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1).
58. EPA interventions require a showing that chemicals "present an unreasonable risk,"
15 U.S.C. § 2605, as do EPA requests for information about chemicals, 15 U.S.C. § 2604, and
urgent actions by the EPA (requiring "imminent and unreasonable risk"), 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
59. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 736-37.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
61. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 737.
62. RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 20.
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the pre-1976 chemicals, 63 which account for ninety-nine percent of
the volume of chemicals in commerce. 64
The authority that the EPA possesses to require manufacturers to
submit environmental- and health-effects data, so-called TSCA test
rules, is similarly circumscribed by TSCA's procedural framework.65
Typically with little or no data, the EPA is required to make formal
findings about the potential toxicity, adequacy of other federal laws,
and alternative options before it can demand that specific testing be
conducted.66 The EPA's findings are then subject to vigorous judicial
67review and to a special hearing process that includes oral testimony
and cross-examination.68
The procedures surrounding test rules add substantially to the time
and cost of promulgating them. The cost for a single test rule is
upwards of $234,000, and the process takes two to ten years. 69
Consequently, the EPA has required testing of only about two
hundred chemicals since 1979, 70 while it has entered into about three
hundred testing agreements with manufacturers outside of this formal
process. 71 The procedures also have impacted longer-term planning
for chemical testing. The high-level committee established under
TSCA to identify chemicals that require testing was moribund for
years, as the EPA largely ignored its recommendations.7 It was not
63. Wirth, supra note 9, at 102 (noting also that the vast majority of pre-1976 chemicals
have not undergone even the most basic toxicity testing).
64. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA andREACH, supra note 2, at 732.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)-(c); see also Applegate, supra note 2, at 732.
66. DENISON, supra note 36, at 6. Specifically, EPA must find that "(i) [a chemical] 'may
present an unreasonable risk' or is produced in substantial quantities and may enter the
environment in substantial quantities or cause significant human exposure, and ... (iii) testing
is necessary to provide the needed information." Id.
67. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA andREACH, supra note 2, at 730.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(3)(B).
69. RISKS OF Toxic CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 9-10.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 8. EPA authority under TSCA section 8 to promulgate rules for recordkeeping
and submission is also underutilized. EPA has issued only about fifty section 8(d) rules
covering about one thousand chemicals, which has led to the EPA receiving "nearly 50,000
studies covering environmental fate, human health effects, and environmental effects." Id. at
10-11.
72. John D. Walker, The TSCA Interagency Testing Committee, 1977 to 1992: Creation,
Structure, Functions and Contributions, in ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (Joseph W. Gorsuch et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993) (describing how, between 1977 and
1992, the Interagency Test Committee proposed testing of 175 chemicals, whereas EPA
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until 2007 in the wake of the HPV Chemical Challenge (discussed
below) that EPA revived its screening and chemical-testing
prioritization program by establishing the Chemical Assessment and
Management Program ("ChAMP").
73
The obstacles built into TSCA have led regulators to address data
deficiencies through informal programs.74 Recognition of the major
gaps in data on high-production volume chemicals prompted the
EPA, with significant spurring by environmental stakeholders, to
establish the "HPV Chemical Challenge." This voluntary program
sought company sponsorship for the testing of, or collection of
toxicological data on, specific HPV chemicals. The original list of
HPVs included 2782 compounds, but this number was later reduced
to 2164 due to exemptions or lack of sponsorship.75
The HPV Chemical Challenge has had mixed success. Among the
positives, the EPA has received partial to complete toxicological data
for eighty percent of the sponsored chemicals, with the remaining
twenty percent having no data as of 2007.76 While this represents a
significant advance over the status quo, these numbers are deceptive
because much of the new data are based on pre-existing studies or
surrogate testing (i.e., use of estimation methods or data on
structurally related analog chemicals)77-less than ten percent of the
toxicological data were obtained through new testing.78 Among the
required testing for only twenty-five; by contrast, EPA and industry agreed on voluntary testing
for thirty-four other chemicals).
73. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Assessment and
Management Program: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/CHAMP/pubs/basic.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2010) (describing how ChAMP will generate "screening-level characterizations
for an estimated 6,750 chemicals produced or imported in quantities of 25,000 pounds or more
a year" and then prioritize them for subsequent toxicity testing or promulgation of control
measures).
74. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 723.
75. DENISON, supra note 36, at 11.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id. at 4. Also, the EPA has not promulgated test rules for most of the "orphaned"
chemicals, and as of 2007 it had only issued test rules for sixteen, or six percent, out of 265
chemicals. Only forty percent of the six hundred newly emerged HPVs have been sponsored.
Id. at 5.
78. Id. at 4; Add'l Testing Needs under REACH, supra note 35, at 15 (describing EPA's
review of 1024 substances in the HPV Chemical Challenge, in which it found that new testing
was proposed for only two to eight percent of the substances). Either (Q)SAR or read-across
methods were used to fill thirty-one to forty-six percent of the data points, which is the
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negatives, the sponsors' over-reliance on "alternatives to new testing"
has been the subject of significant criticism from the EPA and
environmental stakeholders.79
B. Novel Regulatory Developments Abroad
The EU's REACH program has been hailed as a major departure
from the status quo of inadequate testing requirements and weak
regulation of the production and uses of chemicals. 80 REACH shifts
the burden to demonstrate the safety of chemicals-regardless of
whether a chemical is new or pre-existing-from the government to
manufacturers. 81 However, to mitigate the burden on industry,
REACH provides a ten-year transition period during which testing
will be conducted.82 Equally important, REACH establishes three
primary classes of chemicals with tiered levels of testing
requirements.83 Thus, while manufacturers bear the burden of
demonstrating safety, testing requirements vary according to
specified characteristics of a chemical and the manner in which it is
used. This move to replace a uniform system with a calibrated, tiered
framework was driven in large part by concerns about negative
impacts on innovation,84 and particularly "green chemistry." REACH
equivalent of eighty-one to ninety-two percent of the missing data when available test data are
excluded. Id.
79. DENISON, supra note 36, at 4. Further, "[flor 83% of the industry submissions that
Environmental Defense or EPA has reviewed, one or both of us indicated either that more
testing than proposed was clearly needed ... or might be needed." Id. at 18.
80. Wirth, supra note 9, at 100 (describing REACH establishing "the most rigorous
testing requirements of any regulatory regime in the world").
81. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 741-43. It is important to
note that more than ninety-nine percent of the substances likely to be regulated by REACH are
"existing substances" that were in commerce prior to 1981. CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM,
supra note 6, at 29. The application of REACH to existing compounds therefore represents a
dramatic expansion of the scope of EU chemical regulation.
82. Brown, supra note 43, at A769 (describing the provisions in REACH that allow up to
ten years for research and development before a chemical must be registered).
83. See id. at A767.
84. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 20 (discussing the shift of REACH to a
targeting testing regime from comprehensive risk assessments, which have been the primary
cause of delays because "they require consideration of all dangerous effects, all exposed
populations and all environmental compartments"). This focus stems in large part from the
recognition that the pace of comprehensive chemical testing could not possibly overcome the
existing backlog of chemicals, let alone keep pace with the introductions of new chemicals. See
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is also notable for requiring that all toxicity testing data be made
publicly available.85
Classification based on quantities in commerce and chemical
characteristics are defining features of REACH. The quantity of a
chemical manufactured or sold in the EU is the primary metric used
to classify chemicals and to determine the level of testing required.
For chemicals sold or manufactured in quantities of one to ten metric
tons annually, testing should be limited to in vitro testing of acute
hazards.86 The testing requirements are elevated to a standard base set
of toxicology testing for chemicals sold or manufactured in quantities
of ten to one hundred metric tons annually.87 Rigorous "substance-
tailored testing for long-term effects" is required for quantities that
exceed one thousand metric tons annually.
88
REACH further refines categorization of chemicals based on their
toxic characteristics; the chemicals of greatest concern trigger the
highest levels of testing. Chemicals are labeled as being of "highest
concern" if they exhibit toxicity (i.e., carcinogenic, mutagenic, or
teratogenic), environmental persistency, bioaccumulative
characteristics, or endocrine-disrupting capacities.89
INST. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT., EUR. COMM'N, REACH AND THE NEED FOR
INTELLIGENT TESTING STRATEGIES 3 (2005) (concluding that the existing focus on
comprehensive testing had led to the current situation in which we "know a lot about a few
chemicals (< 5%), but we have very little information on ... most"); see also Commission
Strategy, supra note 24, at 5 ("Recent experience has shown that innovation (e.g., in developing
new and often safer chemicals) has been hindered by the burdens of the present notification
system. Ecological, economic and social aspects of development have to be taken into account
in an integrated and balanced manner in order to reach the goal of sustainability."). The EU
Commission goes on to argue that:
Regulations are a major factor in shaping the innovation behaviour of firms in the
chemical industry. The Commission proposes to increase the current thresholds for
notification and testing of new substances, to extend the conditions for derogation for
research and development and enable test data to be used and submitted in a flexible
way.
Id. at 8.
85. Commission Regulation 1898/2006, arts. 117-19, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 36-37 (EC),
available at http://eur-Lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:369:0001:
0849:EN:PDF; Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 750-51.
86. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 12.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 100.
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Thus, both a chemical's quantity in commerce as well as its
properties determine the level of review. If a chemical is sold in low
volumes and is relatively benign, simple registration will be
adequate. As chemicals move along the spectrum toward higher
volume and more dangerous properties, detailed evaluation and
ultimately specific government authorization are required to market
them.90
The EU Commission estimates that most chemicals will not
require elaborate testing.91 It projects that approximately eighty
percent of the thirty thousand chemicals estimated to be covered by
REACH will be subject to the lowest level of review under the
registration program.92  About 5000 substances, mostly those
produced or sold in quantities over one hundred metric tons annually,
are projected to require full substance-tailored testing. 93 At the
highest level, about 1400 substances (five percent of the total) are
likely to be classified as chemicals of very high concern that require
formal authorization beyond the basic registration process.94 REACH
also promotes use and development of alternatives to animal testing,
particularly in vitro testing methods and surrogate chemical structure-
based predictors of toxicity, and thus encourages use of novel testing
methods.95 The aggregate cost for testing under REACH is estimated
to be approximately C2.1 billion over the eleven-year transition
period.96
90. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 12; see also Wirth, supra note 9, at 100.
91. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 16.
92. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 43, at A767 (explaining the eighty-percent estimate is
based primarily on the fact that the vast majority of chemicals are manufactured and sold in
relatively low quantities). REACH also exempts chemicals used in either basic scientific
research or medical applications. Id. at A769.
93. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 16.
94. Id. "Some 140 of these substances have been identified as priority substances and are
subject to comprehensive risk assessment ... " Id. at 6.
95. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 751-52.
96. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 15 (discussing the potential range for the cost
of direct testing of El .2 to 2.4 billion); see also Brown, supra note 43, at A768 (describing
industry estimates that the direct costs of registration and testing could be closer to $4.2 billion,
with indirect costs to industry and society of sixteen to eighteen billion dollars from program
inception to 2020). The cost per chemical is projected to vary considerably, from C12,000 for
one to ten metric tons per year to 6208,000 for greater than ten thousand metric tons per year.
This amounts to a cost of £404 per metric ton for a substance produced in an amount of three
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The shift in the burden of proof for demonstrating safety is the
most direct manifestation of the precautionary principle in the
REACH program. 97 This burden shifting is muddied, however, by
parallel requirements that producers show that the benefits of a toxic
compound outweigh its costs, as well as that a "sound scientific
basis" exists for restrictions on chemical sales and usage.98 Equally
important is the priority REACH places on developing testing
methods that do not involve animals and replacing existing
compounds with "suitable alternative substances or technologies
where these are economically and technologically viable." 99
Canada has adopted a similar regulatory regime under the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999 ("CEPA"). The
basic framework is quite similar to that of REACH. The statute
requires that all "existing chemicals" be evaluated and categorized
according to the aggregate threat they pose to humans, their
persistence in the environment or bioaccumulative properties, and
their toxicity to humans or other species. 00 Under CEPA, the
Canadian government has examined approximately 23,000
previously unassessed chemicals and found that 4300 chemicals
warranted further assessment or control. 10 1 Listing of a chemical is
significant because it triggers requirements that companies provide
chemical testing data that could lead to regulation or restrictions. 102
The failings of the EPA's HPV Chemical Challenge, and TSCA
generally, are exemplary of the pitfalls that pervade the regulation of
industrial chemicals where scientific uncertainties are often
metric tons per year, versus C7 per metric ton for a substance produced in an amount of 3000
metric tons per year. Add7' Testing Needs under REACH, supra note 35, at 29.
97. It is important to acknowledge that REACH is not without its critics. Some scientists
worry that the broad application of existing test methods, many of which they claim have low
predictive power and high rates of false positives, will lead to valuable chemicals being
removed from commerce. See, e.g., S. Hoffman & Thomas Hartung, Toward an Evidence-
Based Toxicology, 25 HuMAN ExP. TOXICOLOGY 497, 503 (2006).
98. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 746, 760.
99. Commission Regulation 1907/2006, art. 1 (33) 2006 O.J. (396) 13 (EC) (listing the
reduction of testing on vertebrae animals as an impetus for registration system reform).
Authorization of a substance and imposition of any restrictions require the disclosure and
assessment of substitute substances. Commission Regulation, 1907/2006, arts. 55, 60(4)-(5).
100. See CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 29.
101. DENISON, supra note 36, at 30.
102. CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 29-30.
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overwhelming. Similar dangers exist under the newer REACH
program, which relies on rough categories for triaging chemical
testing and alternatives to new toxicity testing. These regulatory
pitfalls anticipate issues that arise in the next part of this Article. The
same problems, and the gaming that goes along with them, are found
in related areas of chemical regulation (e.g., testing requirements for
generic versions of pioneer pharmaceutical drugs).10 3 This is not
surprising given that chemical regulations as a class share many of
the same technical and political constraints, and experience in one
area of chemical regulation invariably informs efforts in others. Part
II draws on experience in these other areas of chemical regulation.
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL REGULATION
The historical record is unequivocal on at least one aspect of
chemical regulation: high-salience events have prompted significant
legislative advances since 1902, when Congress passed the first law
regulating "biologic drugs." The 1902 law was spurred by the deaths
associated with contaminated smallpox and diphtheria vaccines.1 4
Passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act ("PFDA") in 1906 was
prompted by numerous incidents of fraudulent mislabeling of drugs
and the publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle.t0 5 Similarly, the
FDCA was passed in 1938 after more than one hundred people in
Tennessee were poisoned by the antibiotic "Elixir Sulfanilamide. ' '0 6
Perhaps most famously, the 1962 Drug Amendments were propelled
103. See infra Part II.
104. Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation of Biologics Manufacturing: Questioning the Premise,
49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 216 (1994) (describing regulation as the "culmination of incidents
in 1901 and 1902 in which batches of smallpox vaccine and diphtheria antitoxin were
contaminated with tetanus-causing microbes"). Thirteen children died in St. Louis from
exposure to diphtheria antitoxin that was contaminated with the tetanus bacterium. JAMES
HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 148
(1989).
105. Aaron J. lhde, Food Controls under the 1906 Act, in THE EARLY YEARS OF FOOD &
DRUG CONTROL 40, 40-42 (Glenn Sonnedecker ed., 1982). See YOUNG, supra note 104, at 204,
281.
106. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products,
82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1761-64 (1996) [hereinafter Merrill, The Architecture of Government
Regulation of Medical Products] (explaining that a manufacturer recklessly used diethylene
glycol in an elixir without testing it); see also Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218.
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by an epidemic of severe birth defects linked to the drug
thalidomide. 10 7 Replicating this pattern, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act garnered political support following
revelations about the ecological harm caused by
dichlorodiphenyltricholoroethane ("DDT"), and TSCA gained
legislative momentum from fears about mercury, asbestos, and most
importantly PCBs.1
08
The commonality of dramatic triggering events, while by no
means unique to these statutes, 10 9 reflects the strong opposition to and
limitations of chemical regulation. Passage of the FDCA, for
example, followed a series of legislative battles spanning twenty-
seven years." 0 Evidence also exists that the public and policymakers
lump chemicals together. With the dramatic growth in the production
and use of chemicals by the 1970s,"' the public came to view the rise
of the new brand of chemicals collectively as a technological
phenomenon that transcended the regulatory regimes into which they
have been divided. Passage of TSCA, which occurred concurrently
with the medical device amendments to the FDCA, was the last major
legislative effort to regulate chemicals in this line of statutes.
The shadow of the FDCA loomed over TSCA. Allegations of the
threats to innovation and delayed access to new technologies were the
primary tropes of the opposition to both statutes. The incremental,
multi-decadinal evolution of the FDCA is a testament to their
107. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1764 & n.35. More modest amendments to the FDCA in 1987, 1988, 1990, and 1992,
most of which were directed at regulatory streamlining, were motivated by the AIDS crisis that
emerged in the mid-1980s. Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past,
Present, and Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123, 136-38 (1995). The 1976
amendments to the FDCA relating to regulation of medical devices were triggered in significant
part by the fallout from defective intrauterine devices ("IUDs") and numerous recalls of
pacemakers. Susan Bartlett Foote, Coexistence, Conflict, and Cooperation: Public Policies
Toward Medical Devices, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 501, 502-03 (1986).
108. See New Breed of Pollutants, supra note 51, at 42.
109. The significance of triggering is common to many pieces of environmental legislation.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
59, 67 (1992); Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 66-67.
110. See generally YOUNG, supra note 104 (chronicling the events between 1879 and 1906
that led to the passage of the FDCA).
111. Richard Lyons, Can Regulators Keep Track of 1,000 New Substances a Year?
Chemicals in Search of a Solution, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1977, at 108 (observing that the
production of synthetic chemicals more than doubled between 1967 and 1977).
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effectiveness.' 12 Industry repeatedly raised the specter of onerous
regulation causing research to move abroad and delay in access to
innovative products." 13 The alleged impact on access to new drugs of
the 1962 Drug Amendments, which imposed rigorous testing
requirements, was still a major issue when TSCA was passed.' 14 This
concern was reinforced by fears about declining innovative output in
the U.S. during the 1970s. 115
The politics and science of toxics regulation contain formidable
barriers to legislative reform of the TSCA. Two important themes run
throughout the history of chemical regulation. The first is that
obtaining adequate information is a costly part of the regulatory
process, both in terms of time and dollars. The FDCA is the poster
child in this respect, as the costs of clinical drug testing run upwards
of $600 million and involve years of work.' 16 The second is that the
uncertainties in assessing chemical toxicity make it exceedingly
difficult to calibrate agency discretion, which tends toward a
dichotomous all-or-nothing standard of judicial review. In particular,
the courts have given the FDA broad discretion" 17 while they subject
the EPA to close scrutiny. 8 These core constraints suggest that
toxics regulation may evolve, but without fundamental changes in the
politics or science, dramatic reform is unlikely.
This Part provides a historical perspective on the regulation of
chemicals and medical technologies more broadly. The characteristic
that binds these areas of regulation together is the persistent
112. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1756-57 ("The reformers believe that the need for advance FDA approval-not only to
market new products, but to conduct, continue, or expand clinical trials, to build and operate
new plants, to modify already approved products, to change labeling, to export-is the primary
governmental obstacle to innovation.").
113. John T. Kelly, Three Years Later, 21 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 21,25 (1966).
114. Toxic Substances Control Act, Hearings on H.R. 5276 and H.R. 10840 before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance, 92nd Cong. 131-32 (1972); Kelly, supra note 113, at 26
(describing how average review times increased from less than three months pre-1962 to about
eighteen months after the 1962 Amendments).
115. See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 18, 21 (2004);
Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, The Determinants of Pharmaceutical Research and
Development Expenditures, 10 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 201, 201-02 (2000).
116. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost ofBiopharmaceutical R&D: Is
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 475-76 (2007).
117. H. Thomas Austem, Expertise in Vivo, 15 ADMIN. L. REV. 46,49-51(1963).
118. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 736-38.
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uncertainty in the risks associated with technologies that impact
human health. The review that follows focuses on two issues: (1) the
importance of allocating who has the burden of proof, and (2) the
variation in testing requirements that is permitted based on either
different classes of technologies or allowances for some form of
surrogate testing. As demonstrated below, the two issues interact in
important ways, such that the latter can limit or even undermine the
significance of the former. Above all, this historical overview reveals
that chemical regulations are converging to a loosely calibrated
multi-tiered system that is emerging as the de facto model for
chemical regulation going forward.
A. Anticipatory Developments in Drug Regulation
Regulation of chemicals, as exemplified by the FDCA, could
easily, though mistakenly, be portrayed as a movement from weak
information-oriented requirements to strict standards that must be met
before a product can be marketed. This progressive narrative
overlooks the Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of 1902 ("1902 Act"), the
first federal statute to impose stringent pre-market approval
requirements on chemicals of any kind.119 The 1902 Act, which later
was amended as the Public Health Service Act ("PHSA"), regulates
biologic drugs, such as vaccines, 120 and to this day represents a high-
water mark in chemical regulation. The PHSA is also notable in that
it began by regulating manufacturing processes, as opposed to end
products per se, because testing methods for biologic drugs were
virtually nonexistent at the time. 1
21
119. Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006). The PHSA defines "biologic product" as "virus, therapeutic
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or
analogous product ... applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition
of human beings." Id. § 262(i). Less formally, biologics are typically defined as "complex
molecules or mixtures of biological origin, but do not include antibiotics or hormones."
Gamerman, supra note 104, at 215.
121. See Gamerman, supra note 104, at 216-17 (describing how regulation of the final
product could not ensure safety, as minor variations in the manufacturing process could have
severe and unpredictable results, in particular the high risk of contamination because biologics
were typical crude extracts from human or other animal tissues).
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The stars aligned for the PHSA, which was supported by federal
agencies, the drug industry, and the medical community.
Government-based public health departments initially developed and
produced the biologic drug for treating diphtheria, 122 the blockbuster
drug of its era, which gave federal officials exceptional authority in
the eyes of congressional members. At the same time, the drug
industry and medical community were in their formative years and
saw the PHSA as protecting their interests. 123 The few established
companies viewed the law as a means of limiting competition and
promoting consumer confidence, which was threatened by
unscrupulous producers. 124 In a similar vein, the medical community
viewed the legislation as important to strengthening the still-tenuous
credibility of medicine as a science.
125
These unique circumstances led to rapid legislative action by
Congress. After the Health Commissioners of the District of
Columbia drafted the bill, with support from the District of Columbia
Medical Society and the Hygienic Laboratory of the federal Public
Health Service, the PHSA passed with essentially no congressional
debate and no public involvement. 126
The PHSA is a prototypical licensing statute. Under the statute,
"[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any biological product unless ... a biologics license is in
effect for the biological product.' ' 127 To market a biologic, a
manufacturer is also required to obtain a license. 128 Biologics must be
produced at properly licensed establishments, which are subject to
"annual licensing renewal, unannounced inspections, [and
122. JONATHAN LIEBENAU, MEDICAL SCIENCE AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY: THE FORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 51, 54-55 (1987) (describing how public
health departments in cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington were
instrumental in producing biologic drugs, most notably the antitoxin for diphtheria).
123. See David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues
Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based
Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 149 (2005).
124. YOUNG, supra note 104, at 148-49.
125. See id. at 148 (describing how the drug industry and doctors were frustrated by
opposing groups, such as "anti-vaccinationists," who challenged the precepts of medicine
during this period).
126. See id.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1) (2006).
128. Id. § 262(a)(2)(A).
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requirements] that product samples be examined by the government
laboratory for purity and potency."' 129 Beginning in 1944, biologic
products themselves were required to "meet standards, designed to
ensure the continued safety, purity, and potency., 130 Throughout the
process, the drug producer bears the burden of demonstrating the
safety of its manufacturing processes, as well as the safety and
efficacy of the product itself.131
For many decades the stringency of the PHSA licensing
requirements were unique, a fact reflected by the modest scope of the
Act's amendments. Other than the 1944 amendments mentioned
above, the only significant change to the law involved the transfer of
concurrent regulatory authority to the FDA and National Institutes of
Health in 1972.132 Later, maintenance of a distinct regulatory regime
for biologics came under significant fire with the advent of modem
biotechnology, which nullified the distinctions between traditional
drugs and biologics, and the regulatory failures associated with
contaminated blood during the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 1980s. 133 But
the statute withstood the political pressures brought on by these
events and remains largely intact. 1
34
Despite following closely on the heels of the PHSA, the politics
and substance of the FDCA could not have been more different.
While the PHSA garnered no public attention, passage of the FDCA
was the culmination of hotly contested efforts to regulate food and
drugs that dated back to 1879.13' The limited scope and lengthy
129. Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(A). In addition, Phase
III testing of biologics generally must be in a commercial-scale facility, and only the
manufacturer of a biologic that meets this requirement can have marketing rights. Gamerman,
supra note 104, at 214.
130. Ch. 373, § 351, 58 Stat. 702 (1944) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(1)).
131. 42 U.S.C. 262(a)(2)(C) (explaining that a biologics license shall be approved upon
demonstration that the biologic product "is safe, pure, and potent; and the facility in which the
biologic product is manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets standards designed to assure
that the biological product continues to be safe, pure, and potent"); see also Korwek, supra note
107, at 125.
132. Edward L. Korwek & Michael N. Druckman, Human Biologics, in FOOD AND DRUG
L. AND REG. 433, 437 (2008).
133. Gamerman, supra note 104, at 220-21. The lines were blurred earlier when the FDA
was given regulatory jurisdiction over insulin in 1941 and antibiotics in 1945. Id. at 219.
134. See Korwek & Druckman, supra note 132, at 438-39 (noting that Congress has
directed FDA to minimize the differences in the review processes under the PHSA and FDCA).
135. See YOUNG, supra note 104, at 45.
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gestational period of the legislation were products of the strong
opposition to the law. Unlike the strict approval standards of the
PHSA, the FDCA eschewed formal regulatory review in favor of
standards designed to preserve the integrity of product marketing and
branding. The 1906 PFDA gave the government authority only to
prohibit and penalize the marketing of drugs that were "adulterated or
misbranded or poisonous or deleterious. 136 Claims about the efficacy
of a drug in treating a condition did not require any scientific support,
and actual knowledge of adulteration had to be proven. 137
The modest scope of the 1906 PFDA was upgraded after more
than thirty years, following the deaths caused by the solvent-tainted
antibiotic Elixir Sulfanilamide.1'3  This first set of amendments
marked the beginning of the FDCA's movement toward the PHSA.
The 1938 amendments established a TSCA-like form of pre-market
review for all drugs regulated by FDA.139 Under this regime,
manufacturers were required to submit safety data in a new drug
application ("NDA"), which became effective unless the FDA
notified the manufacturer within sixty days that the effective date for
the application was being postponed to permit further review. 40
Manufacturers were entitled to market a drug unless the FDA
challenged its safety within the 180-day period given to conduct its
pre-market review.'
4
'
The 1938 FDCA amendments anticipated TSCA insofar as they
distinguished between new and existing drugs. All new drugs were
subject to pre-market review, whereas manufacturers were given
broad discretion to determine whether drugs reformulated with
existing compounds "enjoyed a sufficient reputation for safety" in
order to avoid FDA pre-market review altogether. 142 As a half-
136. Federal Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, § 1, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (current version at 21
U.S.C. § 301 (2006)). Specifically, marketing information could not be "false or misleading in
any particular" as to the identity of a drug. Federal Food and Drugs Act § 1.
137. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1761, 1767, 1790.
138. Id. at 1761; see also Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218.
139. Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218-19.
140. Id. at 218.
141. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1764-65.
142. Id. at 1762.
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measure, manufacturers were encouraged to consult informally with
FDA prior to marketing such products.1
43
The adoption of a formal pre-market approval process took
another twenty-four years and the political storm created by a much
greater human tragedy. In 1962 the severe birth defects associated
with thalidomide, an anti-morning sickness drug, reached a global
scale.'" This event fueled public pressure for more stringent
regulation of the rapidly growing pharmaceutical industry. 145 The
1962 Drug Amendments to the FDCA established a rigorous pre-
market approval process that placed the burden of proof on drug
manufacturers to demonstrate, under a substantial evidence
standard, 146 the safety and efficacy of their drug products. 147 Equally
remarkable, these sweeping reforms were passed unanimously by the
House and Senate, 148 despite substantial political opposition prior to
the shock of the thalidomide debacle.
The 1962 Drug Amendments delegated unprecedented powers to
FDA. One prominent commentator has referred to FDA's authority as
akin to "jaw-bone enforcement" that combines drastic sanctions and
strict criminal liability, both of which are based on vague, highly
technical standards.149 The broad legal framework and complex
technical questions have led courts to be highly deferential to the
FDA. In marked contrast to judicial review of EPA decisions under
TSCA, the FDA has circumvented the formal hearing requirements
for determinations of whether a pre-1962 drug meets the FDCA's
143. See id. at 1763. The standard for product labeling was also increased to prohibit it
from being "false or misleading in any particular" and to impose an affirmative duty on
manufacturers "to reveal facts material in the light of such representations." Id. at 1762-63
(emphasis added).
144. Id. at 1764 n.35.
145. Seeid. at 1764.
146. Id. at 1766. The FDCA defines "substantial evidence" as "evidence consisting of
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts
qualified... to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved." 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006). It
also grants FDA very broad authority to determine the design and conduct of clinical trials,
which FDA has exercised liberally. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, supra note 106, at 1766-67.
147. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1765.
148. Austem, supra note 117, at 49.
149. Id. at 50, 55, 59.
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efficacy standard. 50 FDA successfully avoided formal hearings by
promulgating a high standard for demonstrating efficacy and
disposing of manufacturer challenges on summary judgment.' 5' This
and many other decisions have led commentators to conclude that the
FDA's rulemaking process "has virtual immunity from judicial
intervention or correction."'
' 52
Changes in drug regulation have not been one directional.
Countervailing pressures have caused Congress to whittle away at the
absolute bar to the sale of drugs absent formal FDA pre-market
approval. The pressure to relax standards has come from patient
groups seeking access to new, promising drugs, as well as the drug
industry. From the outset critics warned that the FDA drug approval
process would have negative impacts on innovation and patient
access to new drugs. 153 In partial recognition of this tension, the 1962
Amendments allowed drugs undergoing clinical testing to circumvent
FDA pre-market approval if such investigational drugs were
prescribed as part of a valid clinical study.
154
It was not until the AIDS crisis, however, that patient groups
seeking early access to potentially life-saving drugs succeeded in
liberalizing this narrow exception. 55 During the late 1980s and early
150. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1770.
151. Id. at 1770-72. FDA used a similar tactic to avoiding having to review follow-on
drugs that were derivative of pre-1962 pioneer drugs; if the pioneer failed to meet the efficacy
standard, all of the follow-on drugs were presumed to fail as well. Id. at 1773-74. Similarly,
FDA was nominally given 180 days to conduct its review, but in practice every new submission
of data restarted the clock and no manufacturer has had the fortitude to challenge FDA and risk
receiving a rejection. Id. at 1766.
152. Austem, supra note 117, at 54; see also Merrill, The Architecture of Government
Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 106, at 1782 ("FDA exercises effectively
unchallengeable authority to dictate the number and kinds of studies required to support
approval and nearly unreviewable discretion to interpret the results.").
153. See Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra
note 106, at 1792-93; Richard A. Merrill, Modernizing the FDA: An Incremental Revolution,
18 HEALTH AFF. 96, 98 (1999) [hereinafter Merrill, Modernizing the FDA] (observing that by
the 1990s many critics of the "drug lag" were skeptical of administrative strategies for
addressing it; they instead believed more fundamental changes were required).
154. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1777-79 (explaining that clinical studies are required to secure informed consent from
participants, keep records, and adhere to FDA clinical testing regulations).
155. Korwek, supra note 107, at 136-38; Merrill, The Architecture of Government
Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 106, at 1836-38 (commenting that the AIDS crisis
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1990s, Congress passed amendments to the FDCA allowing the
"treatment use" of promising new investigational drugs on a limited
basis through, in effect, a pre-market notification process.156 Under
this scheme manufacturers were required to give FDA notice of
proposed treatment uses, and FDA was given thirty days to object to
them.157  Subsequent amendments have instituted "fast track"
approval processes for drugs that treat life-threatening diseases and
broadened parallel access to investigational drugs (i.e., to patients not
involved in a clinical trial) where patient entry into a clinical trial is
not possible and no other therapeutic alternatives exist.158 In essence,
these amendments created distinct tiers of drugs that can be made
available to patients on a limited basis through alternative FDA
approval processes.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA"), which governs the sale and marketing of pesticides, 5 9
and the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA occupy a
middle ground between the pre-market notice regime of TSCA (and
the pre-1962 FDCA) and the current pre-market approval process for
drugs. FIFRA is a licensing statute with a twist. While all pesticides
must be registered for a specific use, the statutory standard is
relatively weak-pesticides need only achieve their intended results
and not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."'
' 60
This standard allows EPA to register pesticides suspected to be
carcinogens so long as they achieve their purpose without causing
"unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.' 16' Thus, whereas
the focus of the FDCA is on absolute safety and efficacy, the
marked the first time that effective pressure was put on FDA to approve drugs faster).
156. Korwek, supra note 107, at 136.
157. Id. at 137.
158. Id. at 138-39.
159. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006). FIFRA defines pesticide as "any substance or mixture of
substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, any substance
or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, and any
nitrogen stabilizer ... " Id. § 136(u).
160. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D). FIFRA defines "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment" as "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or a human
dietary risk from residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent
with the standard under section 346a of Title 21 ." Id. § 136(bb).
161. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D).
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standard for registration of a pesticide is relative and calibrated to its
benefits. 162 Further, although the burden of proof nominally lies with
pesticide producers, for the nineteen thousand older pesticides on the
market in the mid-seventies, the burden to obtain reliable data on
their risks effectively lies with EPA. 163 One of the central lessons
from FIFRA is that a licensing regime and burden shifting can be
undermined by lax standards and expansive grandfathering of
existing compounds. Despite the trappings of formal pre-marketing
approval, some commentators have argued that FIFRA's weak
regime is reflective of the waning power of environmentalism and the
growing legislative sophistication of regulatory opponents.' 64
The Medical Device Amendments were influenced by experience
with drug regulation and propelled by another regulatory failure:
eleven maternal deaths from the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.1
65
In the end, Congress remained firm in its commitment to avoid the
purported innovation-stifling effects of the FDCA medical device
approval process. 166 Consistent with this perspective, the defining
feature of the Medical Device Amendments is their tiered regulatory
framework. Anticipating the framework adopted by the EU in
REACH, Congress believed that it would be inefficient to regulate all
medical devices, which range from bedpans to cardiac pacemakers,
under a single regime. 167 A central premise of the law was therefore
that "the great majority of devices would not require premarket
approval.' 68
The new law established three categories: Class I contains general
controls for the simplest devices; Class II contains categorical
performance standards involving requirements for certain features
and essential characteristics of devices; and Class III is for the most
complex devices, and imposes a full-blown regulatory approval
162. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 389-90 (1993).
163. Id. at437-38.
164. Id at 434-35.
165. William H. Maisel, Safety Issues Involving Medical Devices: Implications of Recent
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Malfunctions, 294 JAMA 955, 955 (2005).
166. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1800, 1807.
167. Id. at 1812.
168. Id.
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process analogous to that for drugs. 16 9 Congress's decision to allow
partial privatization of the review process for Class I and II devices is
a distinctive element of the law.170 Begun as a five-year experiment in
1997, 171 the program has since been extended and expanded.
172
The Medical Device Amendments have had mixed success. FDA
was mandated to classify medical devices into one of the three
categories as a first step to regulating them, but the process took
twelve years to complete. 173 Likewise, more than a decade passed
before FDA made significant headway in reviewing and formally
approving pre-enactment Class III devices-the silicone breast
implant controversy being the most visible fallout from this delay.
174
It also remains unclear whether Congress struck the right balance
between ensuring adequate regulatory oversight and not unduly
delaying access to new technologies. A number of recent high-profile
recalls, particularly of implantable cardiovascular devices such as
pacemakers and defibrillators, have renewed pressure on FDA to
strengthen its oversight.
1 75
B. Convergent and Divergent Trends in Chemical Regulation
The preceding survey of chemical regulation reveals several broad
trends. First, placing the burden of proof on the producer has largely
won out. Although relaxed to allow limited access to investigational
169. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2006).
170. See Merrill, Modernizing the FDA, supra note 153, at 106. Under the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, the FDA has authority to accredit organizations to
perform regulatory reviews, but only for pre-market notification of devices similar to products
in Class I or 1I. 21 U.S.C. § 360m. Further, all third-party determinations must be submitted to
FDA, which has thirty days to accept or reject the action. Id § 360m(a)(2)(A).
171. Merrill, Modernizing the FDA, supra note 153, at 106.
172. See Judy Vale, Expanding Expanded Access: How the Food and Drug Administration
Can Achieve Better Access to Experimental Drugs for Seriously Ill Patients, 96 GEO. L.J. 2143,
2155 (2008).
173. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note
106, at 1807-09.
174. Id. at 1814.
175. See, e.g., Mike Mitka, Medical Device Oversight under Scrutiny, 295 JAMA 1109,
1009 (2006) (noting the recall of certain defibrillators and pacemakers manufactured by
Guidant Corporation); Gardiner Harris, Report Criticizes F.D.A. on Device Testing, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A17 (quoting the FDA commissioner's explanation that "sometimes it
takes a crisis before" such recognition of the problems with current testing mechanisms occurs).
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drugs, the FDCA exemplifies this shift and represents the high-water
mark of chemical regulation in the United States. Second, tiered
regulatory regimes such as those found in REACH and the Medical
Device Amendments are emerging as the dominant regulatory
framework. Third, regulation of industrial chemicals in the U.S. is
trailing these developments. TSCA, the only statute that relies solely
on regulatory review, continues to occupy the low-water mark for
chemical regulation. FIFRA lies somewhere in the middle of the
spectrum with its weak system of regulatory approval. The central
role of cost-benefit balancing in each of these statutes further sets
them apart.
The large scientific uncertainties and high costs of chemical
regulation have created discord in the legal system. The tensions are
perhaps most visible in divergent standards for judicial review of
agency rulemaking-FDA's open-ended discretion under the FDCA
versus EPA's cramped rulemaking authority under TSCA. The large
scientific uncertainties have made it exceedingly difficult for courts
to adopt an intermediate level of review, forcing them either to defer
broadly to agency decisions or to use the technical uncertainties as a
pretext for overturning agency rules. This dichotomous treatment of
FDA and EPA persists despite the near identity of the sources of
uncertainty with which each agency contends.
While this striking difference in judicial scrutiny is troubling,
calibrating judicial review in this context is clearly difficult. It is
made more so by the discrepancies in likelihoods and magnitudes of
risks at stake. Although often overlooked, the difference in relative
rates of regulatory rejections is an important systemic difference
between regulating drugs and industrial chemicals. Ninety percent of
drugs fail clinical trials due to problems with either toxicity or
efficacy, 176 whereas conservative estimates based on existing studies
find that about twenty percent of industrial chemicals exhibit some
form of toxicity. 
177
The significance of these divergent base rates is best appreciated
through representative testing numbers. Drawing on the REACH and
EPA high-production volume testing programs, we can project that
176. See PISANO, supra note 18, at 56-57.
177. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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about five thousand chemicals will be tested using sophisticated
animal bioassays.1 78 If past studies are representative, approximately
twenty percent of the tested chemicals will be human toxins of some
form, and recent estimates suggest that the false-positive rate for
animal bioassays is about ten percent.1 79 Although it is much more
difficult to determine the rate of false negatives, the available
evidence suggests that the rate is low, as "[e]very known human
carcinogen has tested positive in laboratory animals. 1 8° I will assume
conservatively that the false-negative rate is also ten percent. For
comparison purposes, I will assume that the rates for false negatives
and false positives in drug testing are both ten percent.
The difference in base rates-twenty percent versus ninety
percent--dramatically impacts the actual numbers of false positives
and negatives. If five thousand industrial chemicals are tested, four
hundred false positives would be recorded. This translates to twenty-
eight percent of the chemicals testing positive for toxicity when they
are not in fact toxic.18' By contrast, 2.5 percent of the chemicals
testing negative would exhibit some toxicity. 82 The corresponding
numbers for drugs are more divergent and inverted: forty-seven
percent of drugs that make it through clinical testing should have
tested positive, while just one percent of the drugs that fail clinical
testing should have been found safe and effective. 83 These
illustrative calculations reveal that false positives are more common
than false negatives for toxicity testing of industrial chemicals,
whereas false negatives are of much greater concern in drug testing.
178. See supra text accompanying note 48.
179. William H. Farland et al., Cancer Bioassays, 5 BRIT. MED. J. E390, E391 (2005).
180. Id.
181. The math is straightforward: (1) 5000*0.8*0.1 = 400 false negatives, (2) 5000*0.2 =
1000 true positives, and (3) 400/(400 + 1000) * 100 = 29 percent of compounds that test
positive are in fact nontoxic.
182. The basic math is the same: (1) 5000*0.2*0.1 = 100 false negatives, (2) 5000*0.8 -
4000 true negatives, and (3) 100/(100 + 4000) * 100 = 2.5 percent of compounds that test
negative are in fact toxic.
183. False negatives: (1) 1000*0.9*0.1 = 90, (2) 1000*0.1 = 100, (3) 90/(90 + 100) * 100
47 percent; false positives: (1) 1000*0.1*0.1 = 10, (2) 1000*0.9 = 900, (3) 10/(10 + 900) * 100
= 1 percent. I am using, somewhat arbitrarily, one thousand for the number of drugs because
this is the number of applications that are submitted for new drugs to FDA annually. Schmeck,
supra note 47, at 99.
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A naive interpretation of these results would favor the current
asymmetric approach to judicial review. Courts would be deferential
to EPA decisions not to regulate and apply greater scrutiny to its
decisions to regulate, while judicial review of FDA rulemaking
would be the opposite. But EPA decisions not to regulate typically
are much harder to challenge because they often involve informal
decisions outside of administrative rulemaking processes, limited
data, or neither data nor formal processes.184 EPA decisions to
regulate thus are already much more likely to be challenged. 85 This
is not the case for the FDA, which is required to affirmatively make a
decision regarding every drug it reviews, so that judicial review of its
decisions is not subject to the same bias. 186 The complicating
dynamic for FDA rulemaking stems from the broad judicial
deference courts grant FDA, which discourages legal challenges
altogether. 187
The multidimensional nature of chemical regulation qualifies the
inferences one can draw from the contrasting base rates between
drugs and industrial chemicals. For one, decisions are not simply
whether to regulate-the stringency of regulation is of equal
importance. Additionally, absolute numbers matter. The impacts of
failing to detect the toxicity of four hundred industrial chemicals
could be severe, particularly if any of them are used in large
quantities, bioaccumulative, or environmentally persistent (e.g.,
DDT, PCBs).188 Multiple factors therefore must be considered in
structuring a regulatory regime that defies a binary rule. The
regulatory base rates provide, at best, a rough rationale for the
different frameworks and standards that have evolved between the
regulation of industrial chemicals and drugs.
These complexities help to explain recent efforts to moderate
chemical regulation at both ends of the spectrum. Under the FDCA,
184. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 737-39.
185. See, e.g., id. at 737.
186. See Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra
note 106, at 1792.
187. See supra Part H.
188. See Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 725; Environmental
Protection Agency, Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/
epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/about.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
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Congress has created limited exceptions to the stringent drug
approval process, while passage of REACH in Europe strengthens
regulation of industrial chemicals. This convergence, which affects
the stringency of regulation and its structure, provides an attractive
model for renewed efforts to amend TSCA in the U.S. In particular,
the tiered regimes found in REACH and the Medical Device
Amendments have the dual advantage of political viability and
respectable scientific grounding.
Regulatory error rates also highlight the permeability of
prospective chemical regulation. This is particularly true of drug
regulation, where the extraordinary costs of clinical testing and
substantial rates of false negatives create conditions in which, as a
practical matter, gaps in regulatory protection are unavoidable. The
same statistical obstacles affect regulation of industrial chemicals, but
the bias favors over-regulation. Statistical base rates, particularly in
drug regulation, qualify the customary distinction made between ex
post common law actions and ex ante statutes. So long as agencies
are reliant on traditional modes of toxicity testing, chemical pre-
regulation will have prospective aspirations that it can meet only
partially, and follow-up monitoring will be an important supplement.
III. SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS CHALLENGING THE
ToxICOGENOMICS PARADIGM
"Fast, inexpensive testing methods currently under development
'are the potential foundation for a national cancer policy that would
prevent this menacing disease."" '
89
The slow progress of toxicology suggests that science is unlikely
to come to the aid of regulators in the foreseeable future. 190 The
189. Environmental Prevention of Cancer Urged, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Feb. 28,
1976, at 2.
190. INST. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT., supra note 84, at 23-24.
Science currently is the bottleneck for the development and validation of in vitro
methods for the replacement of complex in vivo toxicological tests ... However, from
a scientific point of view it is known that in vitro methods and (Q)SARs (either
separately or together) will never be able to fully replace the animal tests for the most
complex endpoints, within the timeframe required by current and proposed legislation.
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standard suite of toxicology tests have changed very little over the
last half-century. 191 Use of animal models subjected to high doses of
a chemical remains the methodology of choice in toxicity testing,
192
despite longstanding concerns about their large uncertainties. A
typical objection is that "uncertain extrapolations, first from high
doses to environmental levels that are usually orders-of-magnitude
lower than those used in the animal studies, and then from animals to
humans"' 93 lead to significant uncertainties.
A new school of toxicology is importing powerful methods and
biological insights from the biomedical sciences, especially from
pharmaceutical research.194 These methods focus on changes in gene
activity levels and the associated concentrations of proteins and
metabolites in specific cells and tissues. 95 Potential uses could
include triaging contaminants and contaminated sites; environmental
and human health monitoring; regulatory reporting metrics; and risk
assessment. 196  High-throughput genomics methods provide a
platform technology that allows more than 100,000 compounds to be
screened per day in the pharmaceutical industry. 97 They hold the
potential to radically reduce the costs of and increase the rate at
which industrial chemicals can be evaluated for toxicity. 198
Incorporation of toxicogenomic methods represents a paradigm
shift in the field of toxicology that will require a fundamental change
191. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 324 (commenting that the basic methods date
back thirty to sixty years); Hartung, supra note 19, at 208; Michael P. Holsapple et al., The
"Vision" for Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century: Promises and Conundrums, 107
TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 307, 307 (2009).
192. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 324.
193. Id.
194. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 328 (discussing the use of new genomics
methods in the pharmaceutical sector, including in silica modeling and in vitro screens); David
J. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental
Chemicals, 95 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 5, 7 (2007) [hereinafter Dix et al., The ToxCast Program
for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental Chemicals] ("HTS [high-throughput
screening] technology optimized for drug discovery is now being refocused to applications in
toxicological screening.").
195. David J. Dix et al., A Framework for the Use of Genomics Data at the EPA, 24
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1108, 1108 (2006).
196. Id. at 1109.
197. Francis S. Collins et al., Transforming Environmental Health Protection, 319 SCIENCE
906, 906 (2008).
198. Seeid.
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in the field's scope, knowledge base, and methods. 199 At the most
basic level, scientists believe that the rise of toxicogenomics will shift
the focus of testing from animal models to in vitro testing of changes
in specific biological processes using isolated cells.2 ° ° Scientists
anticipate that this move to in vitro systems will reduce the need for
inferential judgments to interpret study findings, enhance the
accuracy of testing methods, and lower testing costs significantly.20 '
Changes of this magnitude do not come cheaply and will not
occur overnight. A recent report issued by the National Research
Council predicted that development of toxicogenomics methods-
and use of them as a basis for regulatory decision-making-would
take ten to twenty years to implement and require investments of one
202billion dollars. As I will discuss further below, these estimates are
probably overly optimistic. If experience in the pharmaceutical sector
is relevant-and it should be-recent scientific developments suggest
that progress will be slow. The productivity of drug development,
which uses the same collection of "omics" methods, is actually
declining. Further, scientists are discovering new layers of
complexity that implicate human disease processes and chemical
toxicity. Cancer, for example, is strongly associated with still-poorly
understood "epigenetic" processes that govern the regulation of gene
activity, as are a variety of environmental exposures.20 3
In this Part, I will review the potential impacts of toxicogenomics
methods and evaluate critiques that suggest its capacity to inform
199. See, e.g., Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 329 (arguing that the emergence of
toxicogenomics "will require significant revision of the curricula currently used to train
students for careers in toxicology").
200. Holsapple et al., supra note 191, at 307 (discussing the shifting "focus [to] in vitro
methods that evaluate chemicals' effects on biological processes using cells, cell lines, or
cellular components").
201. Collins et al., supra note 197, at 906 (stating that use of toxicogenomics will serve to
"rely increasingly on human as opposed to animal data; and to offer increased efficiency in
design and costs").
202. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 328.
203. Stella Marie Reamon-Buettner et al., The Next Innovation Cycle in Toxicogenomics:
Environmental Epigenetics, 659 MUTATION REs. 158, 159-60 (2008) (discussing the "growing
body of evidence that environmental exposures, particularly in early development, can induce
epigenetic changes that may be transmitted in subsequent generations and may serve as a basis
of diseases developed later in life" and noting that many forms of cancer are not linked to
epigenetic changes).
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regulatory decision-making will be limited and require decades of
research. It is here that my skepticism is perhaps greatest but also
most uncertain given the inherent unpredictability of a rapidly
changing field like the biomedical sciences.
A. The Promise of Genomics Methods
The purported benefits of toxicogenomic methods are remarkable.
Proponents claim that it will greatly enhance the accuracy of animal
models, 2°4 allow direct measurements of chemical toxicity at very
low levels of exposure, 201 permit rapid high-throughput screening of
compounds for toxicity, 2 6 enable multiple chemicals to be tested
simultaneously for toxicity,2°7 and establish new means for assessing
harm to organisms beyond humans.20 8 If these predictions are
realized, dose-response relationships, which currently rely on
extrapolating from high levels of exposure, could be mapped across
multiple concentrations that match realistic levels of human
exposure.2 °9
Gene expression profiling is toxicogenomics' foundational
technology. It tracks the biological effects of a toxic substance by
monitoring genes that are activated (i.e., transcribed) or deactivated
204. See Cynthia A. Afshari et al., Application of Complementary DNA Microarray
Technology to Carcinogen Identification, Toxicology, and Drug Safety Evaluation, 59 CANCER
RES. 4759, 4760 (1999); Olden et al., supra note 5, at 1966.
205. Marilyn J. Aardema & James T. MacGregor, Toxicology and Genetic Toxicology in
the New Era of "Toxicogenomics ": Impact of "-omics " Technologies, 499 MUTATION RES. 13,
18 (2002); Simmons & Portier, supra note 5, at 904.
206. Richard A. Lovett, Toxicologists Brace for Genomics Revolution, 289 SCIENCE 536,
536 (2000) (asserting that toxicogenomics will reduce the costs and time associated with
toxicity testing); William D. Pennie et al., The Principles and Practice of Toxicogenomics:
Applications and Opportunities, 54 TOXICOLOGICAL Sci. 277, 277 (2000).
207. Scott W. Burchiel et al., Analysis of Genetic and Epigenetic Mechanisms of Toxicity:
Potential Roles of Toxicogenomics and Proteomics in Toxicology, 59 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 193,
193-94 (2001); Olden et al., supra note 5, at 1966.
208. See Michael Waters et al., Systems Toxicology and the Chemical Effects in Biological
Systems (CEBS) Knowledge Base, Ill ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 811, 821 (2003) (asserting that
toxicogenomics will allow comparative analysis of impacts between different species).
209. See Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 326 (describing high-throughput testing
based on a suite of assays that could reveal dose-response relationships over a very broad range
of doses); Collins et al., supra note 197, at 906 (claiming that toxicogenomic methods will
allow testing of compounds "at as many as 15 concentrations, generally ranging from -5 jLM to
-100 mM, to generate a concentration-response curve").
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by exposure to a chemical. 2'0 Gene expression levels are used as
signatures of specific toxicity pathways being activated in response to
chemical exposure.2 11 For example, if a chemical causes direct
damage to DNA (e.g., polyaromatic hydrocarbons) or interferes with
hormonal regulators (e.g., endocrine disruptors), a genome-wide
assay following an exposure would reveal aberrant activity levels
among those genes vulnerable to the tested chemical.21 2 Scientists
believe that such gene expression profiling, by virtue of its capacity
to monitor dynamic biological responses, will enable them to
understand the underlying mechanisms of chemical toxicity.
21 3
Using known toxic compounds, scientists believe that
toxicogenomic methods will enable them to identify toxicity
214pathways and how they are affected by toxic substances. This
process will allow toxic effects to be catalogued, toxic chemicals to
be identified by their specific signatures of toxicity, and efficient
screening of new compounds for potential toxicity.215 The major
challenges to validating these in vitro methods are believed to be
twofold. First, the observed impacts on toxicity pathways will have to
be related to actual disease onset and progression.216 Put more simply,
210. Mark R. Fielden & Tim R. Zacharewski, Challenges and Limitations of Gene
Expression Profiling in Mechanistic and Predictive Toxicology, 60 TOXICOLOGICAL SC. 6, 7
(2001). "The underlying hypothesis for ToxCast is that toxicological response is driven by
interactions between chemicals and biomolecular targets. In most cases, these targets are part of
the cellular proteome (e.g., receptors, ion channels, kinases)." Dix et al., The ToxCast Program
for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental Chemicals, supra note 194, at 6.
211. When a gene is activated, its genetic sequence of nucleotides is transcribed (i.e.,
transferred) to a complementary molecule, messenger RNA ("mRNA"), which is then
transported to a unit of the cell that uses the mRNA as a template for constructing the protein
for which the gene codes. Lawrence H. Lash et al., Genetics and Susceptibility to Toxic
Chemicals: Do You (or Should You) Know Your Genetic Profile?, 305 J. PHARMACOLOGY &
EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 403, 407 (2003). The number of mRNA generated during the
transcription process correlates with the level of activity of the gene in question. Id.
212. Simmons & Portier, supra note 5, at 904.
213. See Michael D. Waters et al., Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing Toxicant-
Related Disease, 544 MUTATION RES. 415, 419 (2003) [hereinafter Waters et al.,
Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing Toxicant-Related Disease].
214. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 325 (explaining the process of resolving dose-
response relationships from perturbations of toxicity pathways using in vitro methods and then
linking them back to in vivo processes).
215. See id. (discussing the identification of toxicity pathways (i.e., biological signaling
pathways) in conjunction with a suite of high-throughput tests to expose "the range of
significant perturbations of human biology that might occur as a result of chemical exposure").
216. Id. at 327 ("Understanding the relationships between early perturbations and more
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toxicity signatures based on model cellular systems must be shown to
be predictive of much larger biological harm. The second challenge
involves relating in vitro test results at specific chemical
concentrations to the relevant exposure levels in vivo. Metabolic
processes that break-down chemicals have a dramatic impact on the
levels of a chemical in vivo, and this introduces a large source of
uncertainty in determining the levels of exposure to relevant target
organs or cell types given a specific level of exposure from
environmental sources.21 7 Continued ignorance about this relationship
is likely to require that animal testing remain an important tool.
21 8
The EPA is supporting the development of toxicogenomic
methods under its ToxCast program. In its simplest form, the
objective of ToxCast is to identify the protein targets and biological
effects associated with environmental toxins. 21 9 In the near-term, the
program's objective is to develop tools that will facilitate the
prioritization of compounds for standard toxicity testing. 220 The
ToxCast program is in the process of using gene expression profiling
to identify signatures of toxicity for over three hundred well-
characterized toxins (primarily pesticides) across more than four
hundred end points (e.g., endocrine disruption).221 Scientists will
complement this experimental work by developing elaborate
computer models for "in silico" testing, with a focus on the liver,
because it is the target of more than five hundred environmental
pollutants.222
integrated apical responses will require co-ordination of in vitro and in vivo studies in the near
term.").
217. Id. at 326 ("Accounting for metabolism in biological systems in vitro remains a
difficult problem . .
218. Id.
219. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental
Chemicals, supra note 194, at 6. The National Institutes of Health Chemical Genomics Center
has taken an alternative approach to identifying toxicity pathways via the international HapMap
Project, which evaluates the differential sensitivity of cell lines. Collins et al., supra note 197, at
907. "The ultimate goal [of HapMap] is to establish in vitro 'signatures' of in vivo rodent and
human toxicity." Id.
220. Collins et al., supra note 197, at 907; Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing
Toxicity Testing of Environmental Chemicals, supra note 194, at 5.
221. Collins et al., supra note 197, at 907.
222. Id.
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Scientists acknowledge that major obstacles remain to applying
toxicogenomic methods in a regulatory setting. The interpretation of
experimental results is likely to be particularly complex. As one
expert has explained: "[n]o single assay or endpoint will have a large
impact on interpretation of the fingerprint or bioactivity profile. It
will be the overall pattern across many assays and data types that will
be the predictor of toxicity used for prioritizing chemicals., 223 The
qualitative balancing that integration of a broad assortment of data
will entail suggests that difficult scientific judgments and discretion
will not be eliminated by adoption of toxicogenomic methods. The
judgments no doubt will be different and, one can only hope, less
subject to uncertainty and disagreement among experts.
B. Shooting for Mars: Signs of Increasing Genetic Complexity
"It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the cloning of
the cystic fibrosis gene .... The implications of [the] research are
profound; there will be large spin offs in basic biology... but the
largest impact will be medical. 224
The decoding of the gene for cystic fibrosis in 1989 is a
cautionary example of the persistent chasm between the promise of
genomics methods and their medical benefits. Cystic fibrosis was
supposed to be a relatively tractable case that would demonstrate the
huge potential of genomics science to revolutionize medicine. 225 This
discovery was a watershed event because it involved the first use of
genomics methods to decode the gene associated with a human
226disease. Yet, as the scientists who decoded the gene now
acknowledge, "[t]he disease has contributed much more to science
than science has contributed to [treating] the disease. 227
223. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental
Chemicals, supra note 194, at 11.
224. P. N. Goodfellow, Steady Steps Lead to the Gene, 341 NATURE 102, 102 (1989).
225. See id.; Daniel W. Nebert et al., From Human Genetics and Genomics to
Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics: Past Lessons, Future Directions, 40 DRUG
METABOLISM REVIEW 187, 190 (2008); Esther F. Schmid & Dennis A. Smith, Pharmaceutical
R&D in the Spotlight: Why is There Still Unmet Medical Need?, 12 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY
998, 1000-01 (2007).
226. Helen Pearson, One Gene, Twenty Years, 460 NATURE 165, 165 (2009).
227. Id.
2010]
Journal of Law & Policy
The genetic complexity of cystic fibrosis has consistently
outpaced scientific understanding. The number of mutations
associated with cystic fibrosis is stunning-more than 1500 have
been identified, each requiring a different therapeutic approach.228
Further, despite expenditures of several hundred million dollars, a
broadly effective treatment has yet to be discovered, 229 and basic
questions remain unresolved regarding the mechanism for the disease
and how specific mutations cause it.23° Moreover, while some of the
impediments may be particular to the cystic fibrosis gene, many are
not, such as the importance of other associated genes to its
functionality.
231
This experience has led Jack Riordin, one of the co-discoverers of
the cystic fibrosis gene, to conclude that a central lesson from the
work on cystic fibrosis is the remarkable complexity of human
biology.232 Riordin has expressed the challenge of applying genomics
to medicine in the following terms: "It's not like going to the
Moon-it's going to Mars. 233
1. The Intricacies of Interpreting Toxicogenomic Indicators
The intuitive appeal of using gene activity levels to identify
toxicity pathways has often obscured the underlying complexities.234
Biologists know, for example, that changes in gene expression can be
caused by a host of processes, such as defensive or adaptive
responses, that are unrelated to toxicological harm. 235  Further,
228. Id. at 167.
229. Id. at 165, 167. Two promising drugs, however, are currently in clinical testing that
appear to mitigate the severity of cystic fibrosis for patients with certain rare mutations. Id. at
167.
230. Id. at 165.
231. Id. at 169.
232. Id. at 165.
233. Id.
234. See Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 6; Holsapple et al., supra note 191, at
307-08 (describing long-debated problems with in vitro toxicogenomic methods: "(1) the role
of metabolism, (2) the ability to extrapolate in vitro concentrations to relevant in vivo doses, (3)
the ability to understand[] organ interactions, (4) the ability to detect epigenetics and other
unknown mechanisms, and (5) the fact that cell lines have a lot of abnormal biology").
235. Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 8 (offering DNA repair and breakdown as
examples of defensive responses and rapid cell growth or atrophy as examples of adaptive
responses); Jeremy K. Nicholson et al., Metabonomics: A Platform for Studying Drug Toxicity
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chemical toxins may not directly impact gene expression, as they can
cause gene mutations that affect protein function without altering
gene expression levels, or they may not cause genetic mutations at
all.236
Changes in gene expression levels can be extremely difficult to
detect. This is particularly true where changes in gene expression
levels are localized in a small number of cells or where they are
highly variable, or even random, because of sensitivities to dose,
timing, and duration of exposure.237 External factors, such as seasonal
variations in sunlight, or internal molecular influences, such as
hormone levels, can be important and are difficult to anticipate.
238
The pain reliever acetaminophen, which causes liver damage through
random modifications of cellular proteins, illustrates this point.
239
Acetaminophen is not associated with consistent changes in gene
expression levels. Changes vary from exposure to exposure according
to the nature of the proteins affected. This variability creates a
chicken-and-egg problem: a central objective of gene expression
studies is to obtain a mechanistic understanding of a chemical's
toxicity, but it is this mechanistic knowledge that is critical to
interpreting gene expression data.
Complex disease processes add to the thicket of gene expression
patterns upon which toxicogenomic methods are based. Unlike
and Gene Function, 1 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DIsCOVERY 153, 159 (2002) ("The distinction
between adaptive and toxic effects remains a challenge with all the 'omics' platforms.").
236. Gary A. Boorman et al., Toxicogenomics, Drug Discovery, and the Pathologist, 30
TOXICOLOGIC PATHOLOGY 15, 17 (2002) (noting that many toxins inhibit cellular functioning
by "binding to proteins or altering macromolecules, not by directly altering gene expression");
Olden & Guthrie, supra note 13, at 7 (explaining that in many cases, there will be a weak
association between gene expression and protein levels, and that post-translational
modifications, independent of gene expression levels, may be essential to the biological activity
of a protein).
237. Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 7-9. For example, alloxan and
streptozotcin are highly toxic but only affect a certain type of cell in the pancreas that
constitutes less than two percent of the pancreatic cell population. Id. at 9. See also Collins et
al., supra note 197, at 907 (acknowledging that in a preliminary study "[s]ome compounds were
cytotoxic across all cell types and species, whereas others were more selective").
238. Boorman et al., supra note 236, at 18; Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 9
(explaining that it is very difficult to control for externally induced variability, such as that
caused by nutritional or hydration status, time of last meal, hormonal fluctuations, and seasonal
and light-induced fluctuations in hormones).
239. Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 7.
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simple diseases, the causal connection of any one gene to a complex
disease is weak and thus difficult to resolve even with powerful high-
throughput methods.240 Specific genes associated with complex traits
may also marginally contribute to toxic susceptibility; therefore, it
makes little sense to treat them as meaningful predictors of toxicity.
Further, it may be very difficult to establish connections between
exposure and harm, because impacts on toxic pathways may be many
steps removed from sites of damage. 241 These and other challenges
have prompted scientists to embrace a highly integrated approach
242
that compiles the results of complementary "omics" studies, such as
proteomics 243 and metabonomics. 244 Scientists now believe that this
kind of holistic approach will be essential to successfully studying the
mechanisms that underlie toxic responses given the complexities
outlined above.245
240. Eric S. Lander & Nicholas J. Schork, Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits, 265
SCIENCE 2037, 2037 (1994) (explaining that the multigenic nature of complex toxin-induced
diseases means that any single mutation may "affect the probability of disease, but not fully
determine the outcome," making toxicogenomic studies much more difficult because a mutation
"may be present in some unaffected individuals or absent in some affected individuals").
241. Bette Meek & John Doull, Pragmatic Challenges for the Vision of Toxicity Testing in
the 21st Century in a Regulatory Context: Another Ames Test? ... or a New Edition of "the
Red Book"?, 108 TOXICOLOGICAL SCl. 19, 19 (2009).
242. PIERRE BALDI & G. WESLEY HATFIELD, DNA MICROARRAYS AND GENE
EXPRESSION: FROM EXPERIMENTS TO DATA ANALYSIS AND MODELING ix (2002) ("[A]rray
data must be integrated with sequence data, with structure and function data, with pathway data,
with phenotypic and clinical data, and so forth. New biological discoveries will depend strongly
on our ability to combine and correlate these diverse data sets along multiple dimensions and
scales."); Meek & Doull, supra note 241, at 19-20 (highlighting the importance of
distinguishing between effects and adverse effects in a scientifically grounded manner).
243. Proteomics is the study of proteins in biological systems, particularly their
functionality and the levels at which they are produced; cells typically contain thousands of
different proteins. Pennie et al., supra note 206, at 278.
244. Metabonomics involves the study of chemical metabolism (i.e., biological breakdown
of chemicals, including foreign toxins) using methods that allow visualization of tissue-wide
patterns of chemical metabolites. Waters et al., Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing
Toxicant-Related Disease, supra note 213, at 418. Importantly, "[m]etabolic changes are real-
world end points, whereas gene expression changes are not; [gene expression levels] merely
indicate the potential for an end-point change." Nicholson et al., supra note 235, at 153.
245. See Fielden & Zacherewski, supra note 210, at 7-8. It is important to note, however,
that the process of combining these different sources of information (genomic, proteomic,
metabolic, etc.) is far from trivial and successful examples of this approach are still relatively
rare. See Mark Gerstein et al., Integrating Interactomes, 295 SCIENCE 284, 285 (2002).
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2. Implications of Inter-Individual Variability
Identifying signatures of toxicity is made more challenging by
differences in toxic susceptibility between individuals. Studies have
shown, for example, that metabolic processes involved in neutralizing
exposures to toxic substances vary by as much as eighty-five to five
hundred percent across the U.S. population "with correspondingly
high variability in cancer risk., 246 These differences suggest both that
identifying consistent patterns will be challenging and that the key
processes may differ substantially between people. 4 ' Multiple
patterns may have to be resolved in order to set regulations that are
protective of subpopulations.248
Interpersonal variation in toxic susceptibility, although still poorly
understood, can be attributed to simple genetic disorders, complex
genetic interactions, developmental differences, epigenetic causes,
environmental factors, or combinations of all five. 2 49 Toxicity
pathways are also complex assemblages of enzymes (and their
associated genes) that are designed to compensate for discrete
mutations and mitigate the impacts of toxic compounds. Yet,
interpretation of test results and identification of reliable signatures of
toxicity are undermined by processes that mediate and buffer the
impacts of toxic exposures.
The obstacles to validating toxicogenomics methods raise
substantial questions about their viability. However, over the past few
years deeper scientific challenges have emerged as the intricacy of
human genetics has come into focus. Reflecting the significance of
this deepening complexity, Science selected "human genetic
variation" as the scientific breakthrough of 2007.250 The editors
246. Frederica P. Perera & 1. Bernard Weinstein, Molecular Epidemiology: Recent
Advances and Future Directions, 21 CARCINOGENESIS 517, 520 (2000).
247. Frederica P. Perera, Molecular Epidemiology: On the Path to Prevention?, 92 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 602, 608-09 (2000).
248. Id.
249. See RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: How GENETIC
INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS,
INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS 58-60 (3d ed. 1999); R. C.
LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA 27, 43-44 (Harper Collins 1993)
(1991).
250. Pennisi, supra note 17.
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observed that researchers had started "appreciat[ing] the extent to
which our genomes differ from person to person and the implications
of this variation for deciphering the genetics of complex diseases and
personal traits.,, 25' These observations reinforce growing concerns
among experts that scientific developments are increasing uncertainty
in biomedical research and development, not resolving it.
252
Scientific developments are forcing scientists to reconsider
established theories about genes, 253 to acknowledge that most genetic
conditions are complex and influenced by environmental factors,
214
and to begin to understand a new class of "epigenetic" heritable traits
that control gene regulation. 5 To give one example, only about 1.2
percent of the human genome codes directly for proteins (i.e.,
biologically active compounds), but almost five percent of the
genome is subject to natural selection, which suggests that so-called
"non-coding" sections of the genome have some functional
significance to an organism's survival.256 These processes are only
now being factored into biomedical research.
The emergence of new layers of complexity is already being felt
in the pharmaceutical industry, which has led the way in the
251. Id. at 1842.
252. PISANO, supra note 18, at 64-68.
253. See Mark B. Gerstein et al., Wat is a Gene, Post-ENCODE? History and Updated
Definition, 17 GENOME RES. 669, 669 (2007), available at http://genome.cshlp.org/content/
17/6/669.fuLL.html#ref-list-1 ("The discrepancy between our previous protein-centric view of
the gene and one that is revealed by the extensive transcriptional activity of the genome
prompts us to reconsider now what a gene is.").
254. David Altshuler et al., Genetic Mapping in Human Disease, 322 SCIENCE 881, 881
(2008) ("Despite great hopes, [the attempt to find Mendelian traits] proved unsuccessful for
common forms of human diseases-such as diabetes, heart disease, and cancer-that show
complex inheritance in the general population."); David F. Horrobin, Modern Biomedical
Research: An Internally Self-Consistent Universe with Little Contact with Medical Reality?, 2
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 151, 154 (2003) (describing studies of identical twins that
suggest environmental factors may account for forty to ninety percent of disease susceptibility).
255. Romulo M. Brena et al., Toward a Human Epigenome, 38 NATURE GENETICS 1359,
1359 (2006) (describing "epigenetic" processes as those involving "the interplay of DNA
methylation, histone modifications and expression of noncoding RNAs, in the regulation of
gene expression patterns from early development to adulthood").
256. Gerstein et al., supra note 253, at 673. A recent study found that "a vast amount of
DNA, not annotated as known genes, is transcribed into RNA .... While the majority of the
genome appears to be transcribed at the level of primary transcripts, only about half of the
processed (spliced) transcription detected across all the cell lines and conditions mapped is
currently annotated as genes." Id.
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development and use of genomics methods. As experience with
cystic fibrosis vividly shows, even putatively simple genetic
conditions are proving to have numerous variants.257 Metabolic
proteins important to drug metabolism and implicated in many
adverse drug reactions display similar intricacies. In one prominent
case, scientists found that seventy-eight percent of the adverse drug
reactions tied to the TPMT enzyme were not associated with the
mutation presumed to be dominant.258 Similarly, although more than
seventy mutations have been identified for a related metabolic
enzyme (CYP2D6), no genetic test exists for predicting its behavior
despite the enzyme's sixty-fold variance in activity. 259 Even the now-
famous BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated with breast cancer,
upon closer study, are subject to much more genetic variation than
previously thought.26°
Scientists now believe that "most, if not all, human genes have
about 3 to 10 major [mutations], and dozens or hundreds, of rare
[ones]., 26 1 An important corollary of these findings is that rare,
detrimental mutations (i.e., a population frequency of less than one
percent) are likely to be undiscoverable prior to an adverse
262
reaction. In essence, the high degree of human genetic variability
that exists will circumscribe, if not preclude, clinical uses of genetic
tests for many complex diseases.263 Use of toxicogenomic methods to
understand and identify broadly applicable signatures of toxicity will
fail for the same reasons when the underlying genetics are complex-
so-called signatures of toxicity will be poorly representative of the
population at large or impossible to resolve from the background
variation.
257. See Daniel W. Nebert & Elliot S. Vesell, Advances in Pharmacogenomics and
Individualized Drug Therapy: Exciting Challenges that Lie Ahead, 500 EUROPEAN J.
PHARMACOLOGY 267, 272 (2004) ("[V]irtually no examples can be cited in which a single
DNA variant site (genotype) is always associated with a particular trait (phenotype)-in all
subjects within all human populations.").
258. Id. at 268.
259. Id. (cautioning that this may be overly optimistic but noting that some scientists have
suggested that "predictive genotyping for CYP genes will improve clinical efficacy for all drug
therapy by 15% to 25%, thereby decreasing adverse drug reactions by 10-20%").
260. See Nebert et al., supra note 225, at 195.
261. Nebert & Vesell, supra note 257, at 268.
262. Id.
263 Id at 272
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3. Newly Discovered Layers of Biological Complexity
Recent developments in the field of epigenetics, which involves
heritable changes to gene regulation that do not involve DNA
mutations, exacerbate these problems by further eroding the
generality of gene expression signatures of toxicity. 264 Epigenetic
traits involve modifications to compounds closely associated with
DNA, such as chemicals associated with its translation or the
scaffolding on which DNA is organized.265 However, "unlike the
genome, the epigenome is highly variable between cells and
fluctuates in time according to conditions even within a single
cell. 266 Thus, while epigenetic traits are heritable, they can be
affected by environment conditions over the course of an organism's
life and can be highly variable from cell to cell. 267
Epigenetic processes are likely to be highly relevant to chemical
toxicity. The role of epigenetic processes in cancer and asthma, both
of which are associated with environmental toxins, is well
established.268 Epigenetic processes and genetics "cooperate at all
stages of cancer development., 269 Further, a recent high-resolution
map of a genome segment revealed that only sixty percent of actively
264. See Peter A. Jones & Stephen B. Baylin, The Epigenomics of Cancer, 128 CELL 683,
683 (2007).
265. Id. (describing how epigenomic "[g]ene silencing at the level of chromatin . . . is
particularly important in orchestrating key biological processes, including differentiation,
imprinting, and silencing of large chromosomal domains such as the X chromosome").
"Epigenetic mechanisms include, among other things, histone modification, positioning of
histone variants, nucleosome remodelling, DNA methylation, small and non-coding RNAs....
These mechanisms interact with transcription factors and other DNA-binding proteins to
regulate gene-expression patterns inherited from cell to cell." Peter A. Jones et al., Moving
AHEAD with an International Human Epigenome Project, 454 NATURE 711, 711 (2008).
266. Miho M. Suzuki & Adrian Bird, DNA Methylation Landscapes: Provocative Insights
from Epigenomics, 9 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 465, 465 (2008); see also Florian Eckhardt
et al., DNA Methylation Profiling of Human Chromosomes 6, 20 and 22, 38 NATURE GENETICS
1378, 1381 (2006) (DNA methylation patterns have been shown to differ significantly between
different cell types).
267. Adrian Bird, Perceptions of Epigenetics, 447 NATURE 396, 396 (2007).
268. Nebert et al., supra note 225, at 199; Suzuki & Bird, supra note 266, at 474 ("The role
of aberrant DNA methylation in cancer has been persuasively argued.").
269. Jones & Baylin, supra note 264, at 683; see also Editorial, Between Genotype and
Phenotype, 38 NATURE GENETICS 1355, 1355 (2006) (describing studies showing that certain
colon cancers in humans correlated with specific patterns of DNA methylation, specifically
CpG island methylation).
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translated DNA subsequences coded for proteins, suggesting that
many regulatory elements for genes are completely uncharacterized,
and that the inter-gene interactions were far more complicated than
anticipated.27 °
The still-emerging complexity of human genetics helps to explain
the modest success of genomics methods beyond basic scientific
research,27' despite the high levels of funding over the last decade.272
Yet, if successful utilization of genomics methods is proving elusive
in the pharmaceutical sector, which benefits from far greater
resources and much stronger public support, it is hard to see how
toxicogenomics could fare better. In fact, at least one commentator
has suggested that the validation problems for toxicogenomics could
be more difficult than those for drug development.273
None of these factors bodes well for rapid advances in
toxicogenomics or its widespread integration into toxics regulation.
To the contrary, regulatory uses of toxicogenomic methods appear to
be receding further into the future and are highly unlikely to be viable
within the next one or two decades. The magnitude of interpersonal
variation exposed by recent developments in human genetics is even
270. Nebert et al., supra note 225, at 202 (explaining how scientists found "many new
transcription start-sites, with an arrangement of far more complex regulatory sequences and
binding of transcription factors than heretofore imagined"). See also George M. Weinstock,
ENCODE: More Genomic Empowerment, 17 GENOME RES. 667, 667 (2007), available at
http://genome.cshlp.org/content/l7/6/667.full.
271. See, e.g., Holsapple et al., supra note 191, at 308 (acknowledging that high-
throughput "approaches have already been extensively studied and have arguably not performed
to their anticipated promise"); PISANO, supra note 18, at 118-22 (commenting on the "crisis" in
R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly for new drug therapies, and
noting that biotech does not have any higher R&D productivity).
272. See Pedro Cuatrecasas, Drug Discovery in Jeopardy, 116 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION
2837, 2837 (2006) (noting that the pharmaceutical industry's discovery and development
budget has increased thirty-fold since 1970, and that it spends $30 billion on R&D per year,
which is greater than the total NIH budget of $28 billion); Billion Dollar Pills, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 27, 2007, at 69, 70 (chronicling the increased spending and decreased production in the
pharmaceutical industry: "[l]n most years in the 1990s the industry spent roughly $35 billion-40
billion on research and development and produced 35-40 new drugs. By 2004 spending had
swept past $50 billion, but the number of new drugs had fallen below 30. Now annual spending
exceeds $60 billion, but the number of new drugs has still to grow.").
273. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental
Chemicals, supra note 194, at 10 (suggesting that the diversity of environmental chemicals and
issues relating to "solubility, volatility, or confounding cytotoxicity" are greater for
toxicogenomics than for drug-related application of genomics methods).
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more sobering. Absent advances in a mechanistic understanding of
toxicological processes, many subpopulations of individuals with
heightened chemical sensitivities will lie beyond detection because
their populations are simply too small. These results have important
implications for safety factors and efforts to set conservative
standards as a means of ensuring broad public protection. The risks
posed by some chemicals could be substantial but unquantifiable for
a significant number of people.274
It is doubtful that the many complicating problems described
above can be resolved in the near-term. As a purely practical matter,
the time and costs required of the research appear to lie far outside
the reach of environmental toxicology. Thus, despite the great
excitement that toxicogenomics is generating, and despite its alluring
potential, the EPA or NIEHS should not expend significant amounts
of their limited resources on toxicogenomics research and
development. For the foreseeable future, they would be better off
investing opportunistically in discrete projects with significant
potential and otherwise waiting for the biomedical sector to resolve
the critical questions raised above. Until that time, regulators should
focus on using the existing suite of tools as openly and efficiently as
possible.
IV. Low-TECH POLICY OPTIONS: MITIGATING ENDEMIC SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTIES
The preceding Parts highlight the gradual convergence of
regulatory programs and the halting developments in toxicity testing.
Toxics regulation operates in a distinctive environment characterized
by large scientific uncertainties, graduated and escalating testing
costs, highly skewed production volumes (a small number of high-
volume chemicals dominate the market for commercial chemicals),
and relatively modest rates of chemical toxicity. 275 Other areas of
chemical regulation share these basic characteristics, with the
important exception of drug regulation, which must contend with
274. Insofar as current test methods are sensitive to certain types of toxic response,
population heterogeneity could cause estimates of false-negative rates to be misleadingly low.
275. Seesupra Part I.
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much higher rates of failure in clinical drug testing. The severity of
these constraints across different chemical market sectors helps to
explain the parallels between different areas of chemical regulation.
The historical record reveals that stringent and weak forms of
chemical regulation-even of closely related types-have coexisted
since its emergence in the first decade of the 1900s. Strict pre-market
approval processes complemented by detailed testing requirements
were written into the PHSA of 1902,276 while the 1906 PFDA was
limited to weak market-oriented information disclosure
requirements.277 The 1938 FDCA amendments introduced the first
intermediate level of regulation based on pre-market review, which
empowered the FDA to intervene prior to commercial sale if it could
show that a drug posed a substantial risk to the public.278 Subsequent
statutes regulating chemicals incorporate at least one of these
frameworks.279
The 1970s was a decade of prolific legislative action. Congress
amended FIFRA twice 280 and passed TSCA. 281' But it was also a
period of growing concern about the negative economic impacts of
regulation. Passed in the shadow of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the
Medical Device Amendments clearly reflect congressional concerns
about the costs of and delays created by stringent regulation.282 The
tiered system of testing incorporated into the Medical Device
Amendments combines all three forms of regulation-information
disclosure, pre-market review, and pre-market approval-into a
single integrated framework.283 Subsequent laws have adopted
variants of this pluralistic regulatory model. The EU's REACH
276. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 132-34, 138-52 and accompanying text.
280. See Act to Amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (1978); Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973.
281. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (original version at Ch. 53, § 2601, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976)).
282. See Travis P. Meek, Proper Preemption or Contrived Construction?: Why Section
360K(A) of the FDCA Should Not be Interpreted to Preempt State Common Law Tort Claims, 3
IND. HEALTH L. REv. 231,250 (2006).
283. Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A
Case Study of the Implications for NanoBiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHics 598, 602
(2009).
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program is the most visible example, but the FDCA contains
categorical exceptions for certain investigational drugs that also
mirror a tiered regulatory model.
A central theme of this Article is that, barring dramatic advances
in toxicological testing, there is little reason to believe that toxics
regulation in the United States will advance to a strict pre-market
approval system. It took almost sixty years for non-biologic drugs to
be regulated under a formal pre-market approval system, and each
regulatory advance was precipitated by catastrophic regulatory
failures involving human casualties. Over the years, industrial
chemicals have had their fair share of disasters (e.g., Love Canal,
Bhopal, environmental PCBs), but these often iconic disasters have
never triggered the political momentum needed to pass prospective
regulations as stringent as those governing drugs.
Ironically, TSCA itself may be an impediment to major regulatory
reform. Insofar as TSCA succeeds in reducing the likelihood that
catastrophic events will occur, the galvanizing forces needed to
promote reform may never materialize. In fact, from an industry
perspective, an optimal level of regulation would minimize the
likelihood of politically salient catastrophes occurring while allowing
low-level chronic exposures to persist.284 The history of chemical
regulation in the United States demonstrates that the business sector
ignores the potential for extreme events at its peril, as they have the
unique possibility of precipitating major legislative action.
Despite the absence of a precipitating event, the passage of
REACH in Europe reinforces my skepticism. The most telling fact is
that, although public support for stringent environmental regulation is
much higher in Europe than in the U.S., 28 5 in practice REACH is
closer to a TSCA pre-marketing notice model than to the FDCA drug
approval process. While critical for "chemicals of highest concern,"
the shift in burden of proof under REACH is irrelevant for most
284. Industry appears, at times, to understand these dynamics. Subsequent to the shock
created by the thalidomide tragedy, the pharmaceutical industry had committed to supporting
the 1962 amendments of the FDCA. See RICHARD HARRIS, THE REAL VOICE 142-47 (1964).
But this strategy was largely a preemptive one-the industry recognized that legislative action
was inevitable. Id. at 143. They supported amendment only to protect against more stringent
regulation in the future. Id.
285. Wirth, supra note 9, at 97-98.
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chemicals-the limited testing requirements effectively give them the
benefit of the doubt. Similarly, the availability of alternative testing
methods, particularly structure-based testing models, has the potential
to erode testing standards for all chemicals. This flexibility contrasts
with drug testing under the FDCA, which combines burden shifting
with stringent testing requirements.286 Moreover, experience with
alternative testing methods under EPA's HPV Chemical Challenge
has demonstrated that the scientific uncertainties endemic to
toxicology can be readily turned to the advantage of chemical
producers who are reluctant to test their products rigorously.
This analysis is not to suggest that REACH is of marginal
importance. On the contrary, its data disclosure requirements alone
are significant. Nevertheless, REACH should not be read as a move
toward a full-blown pre-marketing approval system. REACH is a
major advance toward something quite different, namely, a pluralistic
regulatory framework that reflects the heterogeneity of the products it
covers and the complexities of the scientific knowledge that informs
regulatory determinations.
The prevailing political and scientific conditions strongly suggest
that toxics regulation in the U.S. will not advance beyond a tiered
framework like that found in REACH. This point is useful insofar as
it helps to frame the debate over toxics regulations. Policymakers will
be more effective if they confront the scientific and political
constraints that bound toxics regulation than if they ignore them.
Being a negative conclusion, however, it does little to provide much
positive guidance. The Parts that follow attempt to fill this gap by
discussing several promising measures, including key elements of
REACH, that would enhance toxics regulation in the U.S. This
analysis is of particular importance now because, in the wake of the
EU's passage of REACH, there are signs that Congress seriously
plans to consider significant amendments to TSCA.287
286. See supra Part H.A.
287. See Layton, supra note 22; Lovell, supra note 22.
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A. Promising Legislative Opportunities
Notwithstanding the challenging scientific and political
circumstances, opportunities exist for enhancing toxics regulation in
the U.S. I will focus on three primary types of policies: (1) tiered
systems for toxicity testing and regulatory review; (2) enhanced post-
marketing monitoring and independent meta-reviews of toxicological
studies; and (3) development of parallel policies designed to promote
innovation (i.e., green chemistry). These proposals range from the
well-established, tiered regulatory systems, to the more controversial,
enhanced post-marketing monitoring. Each of them will be analyzed
below, but the space devoted to them will vary according to the
details needed to explore them, not because they are particularly
favored or disfavored.
1. Tiered Regulatory Frameworks
TSCA's system of pre-market review reflects Congress's decision
to minimize the negative impacts of regulation by defaulting to the
least common denominator. Under this reasoning, because most
chemicals are non-toxic and sold in modest quantities, pre-market
review best reflects the low level of risk typically at stake. This
regulatory minimalism is compounded by TSCA's complete absence
of testing requirements and the difficulty of demonstrating harm
under traditional tort actions-both discourage chemical producers
from conducting toxicity tests.288
A tiered regulatory structure avoids the false dichotomy presented
by the choice between pre-market review and pre-market approval,
and it better reflects the heterogeneity of industrial chemicals and
their markets. In a tiered regulatory structure, much will turn on the
metrics used to categorize chemicals, as experience with EPA's HPV
Chemical Challenge suggests. Fortunately, several factors are well
established and defined, including quantities produced or used, direct
evidence of human exposures (e.g., presence in human blood
288. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 33, at 1368-69, 1387; Wendy E.
Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773,
774 & n.l, 784-85 (1997).
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samples), environmental persistence, and potential to bioaccumulate.
Each of these should to be incorporated into any tiered framework
contemplated by Congress.
A central benefit of a tiered regulatory framework is its capacity
to mitigate the scientific uncertainties endemic in toxics regulation.
Simple proxies, such as quantities in commerce, cannot be the sole
basis upon which testing requirements and regulatory standards are
based, as even relatively small quantities of certain chemicals can
impact human health or the environment (e.g., persistent organic
pollutants).289 Proxies are most useful in setting the type of testing
that is required. If testing reveals evidence of toxicity, this result can
be used to elevate the level of testing and the regulatory procedures to
which a chemical is subject. REACH uses both strategies to triage
chemicals that may require formal pre-market approval.
Agency discretion remains a significant factor in tiered regimes. It
enters the process in two principal forms: judgments about how to
classify a chemical and decisions about the adequacy of test methods.
Insofar as the proxies used to classify chemicals are simple and
objective, classification decisions will be straightforward. However,
where ambiguities are significant and the available evidence is
equivocal, classification decisions can invoke significant controversy
because they may be determinative of whether a chemical is
regulated at all. Disputes over the classification of medical devices
have sometimes been problematic for this reason.29 °
Assessing alternatives to standard test methods, such as
mathematical models and the testing of structurally related chemical
analogues, presents a much more challenging problem. It is also one
that already has led to significant controversy, most notably under the
EPA's HPV Challenge Program. 29' Drug regulation avoids this
dilemma by imposing a high standard for clinical testing of all
289. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS: A
GLOBAL ISSUE, A GLOBAL RESPONSE 1, 7 (2002), http://www.epa.gov/intemational/toxics/pop.
pdf; Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 725.
290. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO
ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT
PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 6-7 (2009), http://www.gao.gov./new.items/d09190.pdf.
291. See Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 33, at 1392-94.
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drugs.292 But this is not a feasible strategy for industrial chemicals
given their diverse characteristics, generally small markets, and sheer
numbers. In this context, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars
per chemical on toxicity testing is a political non-starter. Yet, once
regulators move beyond rigid standards or conventions, a potential
morass opens up of often unproven alternatives to direct testing.293
No easy solution exists to this dilemma. A tiered system can
minimize these uncertainties by categorizing chemicals according to
straightforward metrics, but this strategy goes only so far before
complex, technical, value-laden judgments reenter the regulatory
process. One could use essentially arbitrary conventions or rules
(e.g., "alternative testing methods cannot be used in more than thirty
percent of the chemicals reviewed"), but this strategy is questionable
given the large uncertainties in the standard test methods. Reliance on
rigid rules would risk replacing one form of imperfect, convention-.
driven testing for another presumably more costly and time-
consuming form of imperfect testing. The relatively low base rates of
chemical toxicity provide a further basis for rejecting a blanket limit.
The epistemic limits on decision-making created by these
constraints suggest that a procedural, transparency-maximizing
approach is preferable to a rigid, easily administrable rule. Strict
substantive standards, almost by definition, are ill-suited to the
present circumstances in which scientific uncertainties are large and
the heterogeneity of chemicals broad. Reforms could come in two
forms given these conditions: (1) applying enhanced procedures to
EPA decisions to accept alternatives to standard test methods, and (2)
establishing a requirement that all toxicity data, models, and analysis
used to support regulatory decisions be publicly available. The first
of these could be formulated very simply. The enhanced procedures
would create a presumption against reliance on alternative testing
methods and would require agency officials to provide a detailed
justification whenever they accept alternatives to direct testing.
Proposals to eliminate the secrecy of toxicity testing data date
back at least to the early 1970s, and they now are an important
292. See Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra
note 106, 1765.
293. See supra Part I.
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component of the emerging debate over TSCA reform.29 4 The status
quo already has been upended, though, following passage of REACH
and its requirement that testing data be made public.295 It therefore
would be a modest, complementary step to require that, as a
condition for using alternative test methods, any relied upon data,
models, and analysis be made public. These measures would not, of
course, prevent overuse of dubious alternatives to standard testing,
but they would make it substantially harder to use alternatives
indiscriminately and would empower stakeholders to challenge the
more egregious misuses of standard testing.
2. Enhanced Post-Marketing Monitoring and Scientific Meta-
Reviews
There are technical and practical limits to the level of pre-market
testing that can be required of chemical producers. As we have seen,
a tiered regulatory framework mitigates both of these limits by
calibrating testing requirements using rough proxies of potential risk.
Post-marketing monitoring and meta-studies are alternative
mechanisms for mitigating these constraints. Post-marketing studies
can be less expensive, use different methods (i.e., epidemiological
studies), and avoid additional regulatory delays. Their downside-
and it is a serious one-is that they cannot preempt human exposures.
Scientific meta-reviews also operate retrospectively. Their great
virtue lies in leveraging existing data through transparent processes
overseen by reputable, independent organizations. In the biomedical
sector, the Cochrane Collaboration has pioneered meta-reviews of
studies on medical interventions.296 If toxicity data are made available
to the public, Cochrane-like meta-reviews would offer much needed
independent analysis.
294. Layton, supra note 22; Lovell, supra note 22.
295. See supra Part I.B.
296. COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, INST. OF MED.
OF THE NAT'L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
RESEARCH (forthcoming) (prepublication copy at 2-18, on file with author); Mark Starr & lain
Chalmers, The Evolution of the Cochrane Collaboration, 1988-2003, (2003), http://www.update
-software.com/history/clibhist.htm.
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After many years of being essentially moribund, 297 post-marketing
monitoring is receiving belated but significant attention in the
pharmaceutical and medical device sectors.298  The favorable
economics and the potential to conduct statistically powerful studies
are driving this movement. 299 The economics of drug testing are
particularly stark. Because drug research and development take many
years and are very costly, time is extremely valuable. Economists
estimate, for example, that increasing the duration of clinical testing
of a drug by just one month reduces the net present value of a drug in
year one by about $2.9 million.300 By contrast, post-marketing testing
avoids regulatory delays altogether,3 ' and its costs can be offset by
revenues from drug sales, as opposed to consuming capital when it is
in short supply. This asymmetry makes post-marketing testing
economically attractive and thus less susceptible to interest group
opposition.
The prospect of greater statistical power is equally important.
Many rare adverse effects of drugs cannot be detected by standard
clinical testing and could not be cost-justified because the numbers of
test subjects would have to be very large. 30 2  Post-marketing
297. See Alan M. Garber, Is Having More Preapproval Data the Best Way to Assure Drug
Safety?, 27 HEALTH AFF. w371, w371 (2008), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/27/5/w371 ("Despite long-standing plans to improve postmarketing surveillance, such
efforts often take the form of a requirement for more data on safety and effectiveness before a
drug is approved."); Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval
Process, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 621 (2006) (describing an FDA report finding that "of
1191 open post-marketing commitments, only 114 (9.6 percent) had been met, yet none of the
drugs... have been withdrawn from the market").
298. Garber, supra note 297, at w373 (arguing that "the optimal information strategy for
new drugs will likely consist of a shifting balance of pre- and postapproval data collection," as
post-approval studies do not have the same deterrent effect on small under-capitalized
companies, and also allow the costs of studies to be offset by revenue from concurrent sales);
Mitka, supra note 175, at 1109 (describing a recent proposal by FDA to strengthen its post-
marketing monitoring of medical devices); Shelby D. Reed et al., How Changes in Drug-Safety
Regulations Affect the Way Drug and Biotech Companies Invest in Innovation, 25 HEALTH AFF.
1309, 1314 (2006) (making the case that "sizeable increases in spending for postmarketing
safety evaluations are likely to have a much less detrimental economic impact on
manufacturers").
299. Reed et al., supra note 298, at 1310, 1313 (discussing econometric study data on drug
testing showing that it is likely much more cost-effective to strengthen post-marketing study
requirements than pre-market clinical testing).
300. Id. at 1314.
301. Id. at 1315.
302. See F.M. Scherer, Uncertainty and Choice: The Challenges of Pharmaceutical
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monitoring is less subject to these constraints, as drugs with
substantial markets will have patient numbers sufficient to detect
relatively rare adverse conditions. Moreover, the ease of conducting
post-marketing studies is projected to increase substantially with the
rising use of electronic medical records. °3 All of these factors auger
well for the rising importance of post-marketing monitoring of drugs
and the added information that it alone can provide.
Similar benefits exist for toxicity testing of industrial chemicals.
A central criticism of toxics regulation has revolved around its
negative impacts on innovation, which are driven by the costs of
toxicity testing and regulatory delays.304 Enhanced post-marketing
monitoring does not contribute to regulatory delays and is less
capital-intensive than pre-market toxicity testing. However, because
the costs and duration of chemical toxicity testing would be much
less than for clinical testing of drugs, these benefits are far less
pronounced. Further, the expected level of false negatives, estimated
above to be about 2.5 percent or roughly four hundred compounds in
total, is significantly lower than that for drugs. The anticipated
numbers of additional toxic chemicals identified therefore should be
substantially lower than for drugs.
The relatively small economic advantages and reduced potential
for toxic chemicals to be removed from the market suggest that the
value of post-marketing monitoring will have to be scrutinized
carefully. Post-marketing monitoring is most likely to be justifiable
for chemicals produced or used in large quantities or with a
significant or uncertain potential to bioaccumulate. For these
chemicals, their heightened significance and the larger numbers of
potential exposures may be justification alone. On the other side of
the equation, reducing the costs and increasing the value of
Efficacy, Safety, and Cost, 28 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 267, 279 (2007) ("[T]he adverse
side effects that have typically attracted public debate are intrinsically small-numbers events,
with occurrence probabilities too low to yield significant indications of user risk with the
clinical trial sample sizes customarily required by the FDA.").
303. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Pharma 2020: Marketing the Future, Which Path Will You
Take? 7 (2009), http://www.pwc.com/enGR/gr/surveys/assets/pharma-2020-marketing-future.
pdf (predicting that "[b]y 2020, electronic medical records, e-prescribing and remote
monitoring will... [provide] access to extensive outcomes data").
304. See supra Part I.B.
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biomonitoring ought to be high priorities for EPA and NIEHS. A
stronger case for post-marketing monitoring will also exist where
multiple chemicals can be monitored simultaneously and per-
chemical costs reduced. The Kids-Safe Chemicals Act, pending in
Congress, adopts an innovative approach to post-marketing
monitoring under a provision that requires government-based
biomonitoring (e.g., monitoring of humans for the presence of certain
classes of commercial chemicals), and this information is then
available as a potential basis for further regulatory action.30 5 As this
example suggests, the value of post-marketing monitoring ultimately
will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; blanket
endorsement or rejection is not possible.
Meta-reviews offer an alternative cost-effective means for
evaluating the risks posed by industrial chemicals. This strategy is
becoming increasingly important in the biomedical sector. 30 6 The
Cochrane Collaboration, which is exemplary of this movement, is
dedicated to conducting and updating meta-reviews of medical
interventions, but it is by no means the only one.30 7 Begun in 1993 as
an international non-profit organization, the Cochrane Collaboration
conducts meta-reviews that are published and updated regularly and
prepared according to strict quality-control standards.30 8 Cochrane
reviews, which include technical abstracts and summaries for
laypeople, are made broadly available to the public. 30 9 As of January
2010, the Cochrane database listed more than six thousand reviews of
medical treatments and diagnostic tests.3 10
The viability of this independent, collaborative model is obviously
contingent on toxicity study data becoming publicly available. As
described above, provisions in REACH will force the public release
305. S. 3040, §§505-506, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 6100, §§505-506, 110th Cong.
(2008).
306. Hoffman & Hartung, supra note 97, at 503-05 (arguing that the most important
methods used to assess and evaluate the treatment options for a given medical question are
systematic reviews and meta-analyses).
307. COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, supra note
296, at 2-18.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. The Cochrane Library, Record Counts, http://ww3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/
mrwhome/106568753/ProductDescriptions.html#creviews (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
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of a great deal of the privately held toxicity data and should make the
collaborative approach possible.31'
Independent meta-reviews would provide an alternative to
government reviews, such as those conducted under EPA's Integrated
Risk Information System ("IRIS"), 312 and would augment the
resources available for this work. EPA reviews are deficient both in
number and on substantive grounds. The IRIS system repeatedly has
been criticized for the deficiencies in its peer review processes and its
failure to involve a representative range of stakeholders.1 3 The IRIS
database is also far from complete, with many commercial chemicals
yet to be reviewed and many existing reviews significantly
outdated.314 Moreover, the significant procedural obstacles and
budgetary constraints experienced by the EPA suggest that significant
improvements in the IRIS database will be difficult to achieve.315
The establishment of the Cochrane Collaboration was prompted
by similar circumstances, namely, a critical need for reliable
information about the safety and efficacy of medical treatments.31 6
The success of the Cochrane Reviews demonstrates the great value of
this collaborative, open-science-based approach to conducting
scientific reviews. Modeled off the Cochrane Collaborative, an
international non-governmental organization dedicated to conducting
311. See supra Part I.B.
312. Similar to the Cochrane reviews, IRIS studies generate a consensus opinion on the
potency of toxic chemicals regulated by EPA based on an assessment of the available
toxicological studies. See Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), http://www.epa.gov/
NCEA/iris/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (stating EPA's descriptions IRIS); see also MARK R.
POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 31 (1999). EPA uses
potencies/reference doses and modeling methods to calculate regulatory standards for each of
the chemicals it regulates. Id. at 31-32. As such, the IRIS toxicological reviews provide the
final toxicological information used by EPA to calculate regulatory standards for toxic
substances.
313. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT: EPA HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO STRENGTHEN ITS PROCESS, BUT IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN PLANNING, DATA
MANAGEMENT, AND TRAINING 13-14 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06595.pdf
[hereinafter GAO, EPA IMPROVEMENTS].
314. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL ASSESSMENTS: Low
PRODUCTIVITY AND NEW INTERAGENCY REVIEW PROCESS LIMIT THE USEFULNESS AND
CREDIBILITY OF EPA'S INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM, 3-4, 15-16, 18-21 (2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08440.pdf [hereinafter GAO, EPA's IRIS].
315. Id. at 55-58.
316. Starr & Chalmers, supra note 296.
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meta-reviews of toxicity studies could take advantage of global
human resources and avoid the problems with peer review and
scientific independence that have undermined IRIS.317
Creation of such an independent scientific organization would not
experience the controversy common in other areas of environmental
science and policy (e.g., The Nature Conservancy's sponsorship of
ecological science and monitoring). 318 Scientists, non-governmental
organizations, and citizens play critical roles in collecting, updating,
and maintaining data relevant to environmental regulation and
policy.319 Their growing importance is reflected in the willingness of
federal agencies, particularly the EPA, to work with them and
provide both technical and financial support.32° More recently, federal
agencies have begun to recognize and utilize non-profit and citizen-
generated data by incorporating this work into official reports. 321
Citizen groups and non-profit organizations are now frequently at the
forefront of efforts to develop innovative technologies and
programs.322 Strong precedent therefore exists for the viability of the
Cochrane Collaboration approach to enhance the quality and breadth
of toxicity information on industrial chemicals.
3. Affirmative Policies to Promote Innovation
A recurring criticism of toxics regulation is that it threatens
innovation, particularly environmentally beneficial innovation such
as new forms of "green chemistry," by raising the costs of
317. See, e.g., GAO, EPA IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 313, at 13-14; GAO, EPA's IRIS,
supra note 314, at 26.
318. See The Nature Conservancy, Conservation Science, http://www.nature.org/tnc
science/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
319. David E. Adelman, The Challenge ofAbrupt Climate Change for U.S. Environmental
Regulation, 58 EMORY L.J. 379, 400-02 (2008).
320. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 223 (2000) (making the point that "charitable tax
deductions thus permit the government to leverage its monitoring budget with private
contributions that exceed the foregone tax revenue"); EPA's Volunteer Monitoring Program,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/monitoring/volunteer/epasvmp.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
321. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 320, at 219 (describing how organizations receiving
direct governmental support now monitor "portions of almost 1000 streams and rivers; 2800
ponds, lakes, and wetlands; and 4 major estuaries").
322. Id. at 224 (describing how groups have developed sophisticated monitoring systems
that rival and sometimes exceed the capabilities of local public enforcement agencies).
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commercializing new chemicals.323 While the increased costs
associated with chemical regulation cannot be eliminated, they can be
mitigated or offset by complementary innovation-oriented policies.324
In the context of climate change regulation, compelling evidence
exists for the effectiveness of parallel regulatory and innovation
policies.325 For example, Denmark experienced unique success in its
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and a critical feature of
its approach is the use of policies designed to promote technology
development and adoption.326 Recent economic analyses confirm the
value in combining environmental regulations with complementary
innovations policies.327
In the context of chemical regulation, precedent for an integrated
approach also exists. In the pharmaceutical sector, the Orphan Drug
Act of 1983 ("ODA") maintains regulatory objectives while
providing incentives for innovation.328 The term "orphan drug" refers
to the absence of drugs available for rare diseases 329 whose small
markets are insufficient to justify the large costs of drug
323. See supra Part I.A.
324. See David E. Adelman and Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change
Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 835, 858-60 (2008) (discussing
ability of states to adopt an advantageous program that couples innovation-related policies with
climate change regulation).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 860; Monica Prasad, On Carbon, Tax and Don't Spend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2008, at A27 (arguing that facilitating technology shifting is essential to reducing carbon
emissions). See also Monica Prasad, Taxation as a Regulatory Tool: Lessons from
Environmental Taxes in Europe, (Feb. 1-3, 2008), http://www.sociology.northwestem.edu/
faculty/prasad/Taxation_3 25_08.
327. LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INDUCED
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND CLIMATE POLICY iv (2004), http://www.pewclimate.org/doc
Uploads/ITC_Report F2.pdf ("To promote ITC and reduce GHG emissions most cost-
effectively, two types of policies are required: policies to reduce emissions and incentives for
technological innovation.").
328. Wesley Yin, Market Incentives and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON.
1060, 1060-62 (2008). Indeed, the success of the ODA has led other countries such as Japan,
Australia, and the EU to adopt similar laws. Paul D. Maher & Marlene Haffner, Orphan Drug
Designation and Pharmacogenomics, 20 BIODRUGS 71, 72 (2006).
329. The Act covers "any disease or condition which ... affects less [sic] than 200,000
persons in the United States." 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2006). It provides for a streamlined
FDA review process with technical support to assist in the development of clinical testing
regimes. See David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and
Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 374-76
(2005).
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development. Using an eclectic mix of policy instruments, the ODA
has overcome this market failure. In the decade preceding passage of
the ODA, thirty-four orphan drugs were produced.33 ° In contrast, over
the first twenty years following its passage, 229 orphan drugs were
commercialized. 331 These developments have led to a substantial
increase of more than sixty-nine percent in the number of clinical
trials conducted on drugs for rare diseases.332
The ODA policies range from regulatory streamlining to more
traditional market-based incentives. By streamlining clinical trials
and providing technical assistance,333 FDA has reduced the time for
drug approvals by fifty percent. In effect, this streamlining has added
one to two years to the duration of patent protection for each drug.334
Direct economic support and incentives are also key elements of the
ODA, including a fifty percent tax credit for the costs of clinical
trials, which amounts to a rebate of millions of dollars on the large
up-front costs associated with drug development.335
The ODA has not been free of criticism, and concerns have been
raised about its susceptibility to gaming and over-inclusiveness.
Drugs with blockbuster potential (i.e., billions in annual revenues)
have received orphan drug status when they can be used to treat
330. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 370; see also Maher & Haffner, supra note 328, at 71
(noting that fewer than ten orphan drugs were commercialized in the decade prior to the passage
of the ODA, whereas 269 orphan drugs were commercialized less than twenty-five years after
its passage).
331. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 370.
332. Yin, supra note 328, at 1061 (noting scholarship finding that after the ODA, the
increase in the variety of drugs was higher for rare diseases than for non-rare diseases).
333. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS, AND
REWARDS 71 (1993), http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9336.pdf (observing that orphan drugs
"may have a very different cost structure from other NCEs, not only because of the tax credit
but also because they may involve smaller and shorter clinical trials than other drugs"); Henry
Grabowski, Increased R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases-Lessons From the Orphan
Drug Act 16-17 (July 2003), http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Other/Grabowski/Orphan_
Drug.pdf (finding that the number of subjects in clinical trials for orphan drugs was much
smaller than the average for all drugs and that "the representative orphan drug has R&D costs
that are significantly lower than non-orphan compounds").
334. Cf id. at 71-72 (stating that, for the period 1985-1990, the average approval time for
drugs classified as "A" by the FDA was 25.7 months for non-orphans and only 18.1 months for
orphans).
335. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 369. The aggregate value of this tax credit is
significant-through 2007 it cost nearly $2 billion, and it is projected to cost $1.9 billion
between 2008 and 2012. Yin, supra note 328, at 1062.
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multiple diseases, one of which is sufficiently rare.336 Although
recent studies suggest that such cases are the exception to the rule,337
these tensions highlight the importance of carefully structuring
innovation policies to ensure that they stimulate new development as
opposed to merely providing windfalls for work that would have
occurred in their absence.
The examples described above are illustrative of the approaches
that could be adopted to mitigate the impacts of regulatory costs on
innovation. Experience with climate change policies and orphan
drugs shows that when traditional regulations and innovation policies
work in tandem they can guide innovation in directions with high
social value. Further, insofar as the technical challenges are more
tractable-and given the stasis of toxicology, it is hard to see how
they could not be-focusing limited government and private-sector
resources on green innovation has the potential to circumvent the
deep uncertainties that have come to characterize regulation of
industrial chemicals.
Experience in other areas also demonstrates that integrating
regulation and innovation policies cannot be done haphazardly.
Success is dependent on identifying the barriers both to new
innovation and to adoption of underutilized existing technologies.
These obstacles must be evaluated against the gaps left by the
relevant regulatory framework. Similarly, as the ODA example
suggests, careful consideration must be given to the scope of the
incentives provided to avoid windfalls and to ensure that socially
beneficial innovation is being effectively targeted. Designing policies
to promote green chemistry, for example, is likely to be more
difficult than designing policies for orphan drugs, as the attributes of
"green" chemicals and processes are complex and thus not amenable
to a simple numerical cutoff like that used in the ODA.
None of these considerations precludes development of parallel
innovation policies. They instead highlight the care that must be
336. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 365, 370-71. The multi-billion dollar anemia drug,
Epogen, is the most glaring example of this occurring. Id. at 370-71.
337. Grabowski, supra note 333, at 16 (describing evidence that the average sales peak for
an orphan drug is about $100 million annually versus an average peak of $500 million annually
for standard drugs).
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taken in coordinating traditional regulatory and newer innovation
policies to capitalize on the valuable synergies that often are
overlooked.
CONCLUSIONS
Cautious pessimism is perhaps an overly negative framing of my
perspective, and yet I do not feel comfortable resorting to the obvious
alternative "realism" because it comes across as presumptuous.
Further, the scientific and regulatory uncertainties implicated by
toxics regulation leave ample room for a broad range of "realist"
positions; I am merely on the pessimistic end of this spectrum.
My primary objectives in this Article are to place toxics regulation
in the broader historical context of chemical regulation as a general
class and to make the case that a great deal of work is still needed
before toxicogenomics will become widely used in toxics regulation.
The history of chemical regulation in the United States suggests basic
limits on regulatory regimes for industrial chemicals. I argue that a
tiered regime similar to that found in REACH is the brand of
regulation most likely to emerge if TSCA reform were to move
forward. The obdurate limitations of toxics science reinforce this
view.
My pessimism is not nearly as unyielding as the scientific
uncertainties. The-relative weakness of TSCA standards coupled with
its inertia-filled procedures leave substantial room for effective
reforms. Tiered systems for regulating industrial chemicals,
enhancement of post-marketing monitoring, and innovation policies
directed at promoting new chemicals and processes each holds
significant promise. REACH very well may be instrumental in
opening the door to such reforms in the United States.
I am very pessimistic about two things. The first is that seeking to
replicate the model of strict pre-marketing approval exemplified by
drug regulation under the FDCA is untenable from both a political
and scientific perspective. The second is that investing heavily in
toxicogenomics research and development with the hope that it will
rescue toxics regulation from deep scientific uncertainties is
premature at best and may prove illusory in the long term.
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